A Drunken Lover

By Rob Ashgar, "A Rock and Roll Jihad for the Soul of Pakistan" - The Huffington Post - New York, NY, USA
Wednesday, May 6, 2009

The Taliban's forerunners stole the show from Salman Ahmad one evening two decades ago. He and a growing army of Pakistani artists and cultural leaders intend to take it back -- and in the process, to rescue their nation and renew the cultural vibrancy of their ancient heritage.

Ahmad's plan was to impress the audience at a talent show at his Pakistani college, by playing a spot-on version of Van Halen's legendary "Eruption." But militant students from the local madrasas managed to rock the crowd even more convincingly, erupting onto the stage, declaring music to be blasphemy and violently sacrificing Ahmad's Les Paul [solid body electric guitar] to the gods of intolerance. They even destroyed the drummer's kit for good measure. A little like the Who at their peak, just without amplifiers.

Ahmad was destined by heritage and by coursework to be a doctor, and he dutifully responded. Still, he loved music enough to decide later that guitars rather than stethoscopes would be his instrument of healing.

He went on to help create what is known throughout South Asia and beyond as Sufi Rock, as his group Junoon persevered through bannings, wiretappings and intimidation to sell some 25 million records in India and Pakistan. Junoon proved along the way that culture and art can bridge hostile neighbors -- which is exactly what bothered their enemies, who exploit such divisions to maintain their own power.

Sufism represents spiritual kryptonite to the Taliban -- and it offers a fresh but ancient face of Islam to a West that is wary of invading hordes. Sufism is the tolerant, embracing and mystical form of Islam that influenced the Asian subcontinent during a thousand-year period of cultural and intellectual development. It unleashes a spirit of singing and dancing and celebration and unity, a spirit that threatens grim Talibaners at their core.

Mention Islam to typical native-born Americans, and they are likely, intentionally or unintentionally, to conjure up an image of Osama bin Laden or the Ayatollah Khomeini. They would be surprised to find that the BBC has called a Muslim, Rumi, the most popular poet in America. Rumi speaks not of struggles against outer enemies, but against the inner jihad against anything that would keep the soul from loving God and others unconditionally. Where modern jihadists seem to be violent incarnations of agitation and self-doubt, Rumi asks the enlightened soul to "feel the artistry moving through and be silent."

The mystical traditions of Western and Eastern religions have powerful common denominators, but Sufism brings its own flavor of pleasure-loving mischief, calling as it does for the soul to become a drunken lover in communion with its Creator ("Junoon" itself means passion or obsession). It is not the stuff of violent wars, but of spirits that seek to place violence in subjection to the liberated human spirit. And it may offer a potion capable of curing the cancer that has staked a claim on a mass of the Muslim world.

The BBC recently examined Sufism's potential to play such a role in Pakistan, and has also noted the rise of Sufism in Iran, which that nation's leaders would obviously see as a threat. Sufism's potential is even expanded by its tendency to express itself in form of art and music that transport and transform the human spirit in ways that will not be subjected to despots.

This form of art is changing us in ways we don't even realize. Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, the late Sufi qawwali singer from Pakistan, enjoyed legions of fans throughout South Asia and even the West, collaborating with and mentoring artists ranging from Ahmad to Eddie Vedder.

Ahmad says his experience seeing Led Zeppelin perform in Madison Square in 1977 helped call him to a musical career, and that it also exposed him to the cultural collision of East and West (think of South-Asian and Middle-Eastern elements in "Kashmir," "Black Mountain Side" and Jimmy Page's eerie violin bow solos, and their trips to Morocco, and how such influences took center stage in Page's and Robert Plant's reunion in 1995). It's entirely possible that Zeppelin's desire and ability to bridge East and West made them so potent, in ways that would confound critics who initially dismissed them.

As Ahmad himself wrote in the Huffington Post in 2007, "The band's music validated the belief of another hero of mine, the great Sufi Ibn al-Arabi, that only through a multitude of sources can universal harmony be achieved."

Ahmad would continue to combine sources and bridge worlds, in a way that put Western instrumentation in the service of indigenous arts. In much the same way, he believes Pakistan does not need to mimic the West as much as it needs to blend influences in a way that reinvents its ancient heritage within our new global context.

But he hardly believes that the arts and culture are sufficient for such a rescue operation: Hungry bellies cannot hear divine anthems. "Education, jobs and peace," he tells me, "are what I keep hearing about when I talk to Pakistanis." He says that Pakistanis must move effectively to deliver such basic services, as the Taliban has been winning converts by playing a Robin Hood role to fill the void that has not been addressed by a succession of dysfunctional governments.

Having served as a UN goodwill ambassador in past years, he now leads efforts to spur a Pakistani renaissance through both culture and commerce -- efforts that begin by mobilizing Pakistanis to seize their ownership stake in society and that encourage the West to play a secondary supporting role.

It is an ambitious and urgent venture, but he has allies who believe he's uniquely equipped to help Pakistanis steal back the stage from the Taliban. "He's been incredibly courageous in rejecting this false assumption that Pakistan would either be a military dictatorship or a fundamentalist theocracy," says Varun Soni, the dean of religious life at the University of Southern California and a colleague of Ahmad's. "That's allowed him to inspire millions of progressive kids in Pakistan."

Soni, a practicing Hindu who is impressed by the Muslim rocker's ability to gain popularity across the contentious Indian subcontinent, thinks of him "like a Bob Marley or a John Lennon -- someone who transcended superstar status to become a prophetic voice."

Ahmad, for his part, appears genuinely humble and self-effacing. "Left to myself," he says, "I'd just jam on the guitar all day" in his home outside Manhattan. But he is not being left to himself, for now, and he is able to summon a passion for the challenge that harkens back to the challenges he overcame to first perform his craft in Pakistan. "This is a great opportunity for Pakistan to reinvent itself," he says excitedly, which is most decidedly an act of putting a good spin on a lousy situation. But that is what leaders of significance do.

"Knowest thou not the beauty of thine own face?" asked Rumi, who is the source of lyrics for many of Junoon's songs. "Quit this temper that leads thee to war with thyself."

It is this approach that appears to inform Ahmad, as he seeks to help Pakistanis renew a distinct culture that he sees as their ancient birthright -- a life-affirming culture that he believes cannot be silenced, just as the madrasas students could not silence his own love for music.

[Visit Junoon's website http://www.junoon.com/]

Integrated

By Rachel Reeves, "UCSB Hosts Lecture on Islamic Resurgence in Malian Youth " - The Santa Barbara Independent - Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Anthropologist Dr. Soares Talks Rasta Sufis in Mali’s Muslim Culture

Friday morning, a handful of scholars gathered in a small UCSB conference room to hear Dr. Benjamin Soares, anthropologist and senior researcher at the African Studies Center in the Netherlands, speak about “rasta Sufis” and Muslim youth culture in Mali.

Soares, who has been studying the Malian people for over twenty years, discussed the ways in which Malian youth have been appropriating Islam in recent years, making fundamental changes to the country’s most prevalent religion.

Soares cited Mali’s regime change of the early nineties—which was initiated by a coup and culminated in the country’s first democratic election—as an impetus for dramatic socioeconomic and political change.

Democratization spurred the expansion of the media, opening new spaces for public debate and religious organization, according to Soares. Political and economic liberalization created a new class of elites and a consumerist culture that wedged a divisive gap between generations, as young people began to pressure their parents to buy “more,” he said.

But despite the rapid changes sweeping the country, Mali still ranked among the poorest countries in the world. Soares said he watched as many young Malian became disillusioned with the “formal politics that they hoped would alleviate poverty,” he said.

A job shortage gave rise to the phenomenon of the “unemployed tea drinker,” as educated and overqualified youth began “killing time” by gathering together to drink Chinese green tea, he said. From this community of tea drinkers came new waves of cultural production, as members turned to rap music and religion in an attempt to “drea[m] of a different world,” Soares said.

For Soares, the return to religion among youth seemed particularly marked and interesting. Owing to the influences of Bob Marley, the Cote d’Ivoire band Alpha Blondy, and the popularization of reggae music, groups of young Malian Muslims began to incorporate elements of rasta culture into their religious tradition.

Many began wearing their hair in dreadlocks or long braids, and were “jokingly, or even mockingly, called ‘Rasta Sufis,’” Soares said. They claimed to be imitating the unkempt hair of Malian Sufis past, and their clothing was “Muslim, traditionally African, or a combination of the two,” he said. Many wore the African kaftan, or traditional drawstring trousers and turbans, prayer beads, and tags featuring laminated pictures of prominent spiritual leaders.

Soares focused a better part of his discussion on the religious leaders that have emerged as a response to the changing nature of Malian Islam. He spent a significant amount of time talking about Cheick Soufi Bilal, an important figure in Mali’s Sufi culture.

Bilal, a self-proclaimed “religious entrepreneur,” published pamphlets claiming he was a “luminous source of divine energy” and the representation of “exemplary piety.” Among Malian youth, he developed quite a following.

In recent years, his religious enterprise has grown exponentially to include a large compound and a fleet of cars. By joining Bilal’s movement, Soares said, a number of former “tea drinkers” are able to find work. Soares said he’s heard rumors that Bilal has a relationship with former president Moussa Traoré, and there are rumors that Mali’s first lady is one of his main patrons.
Bilal has not only integrated Rasta style into his Sufi religion, but also elements of sport and music culture into his movement. He is an avid football fan and also has ties to major African pop stars. He’s also adept at using media to advertise his organization, and remains an important religious figure today.

Whether the Islamic resurgence among Malian youth is a product of economic circumstance or a result of the rise of charismatic Sufi leaders, Soares isn’t sure. He does know, however, that it’s an interesting phenomenon to follow, and plans to return to Mali later this year.

The lecture was hosted by the African Studies Research Focus Group and funded by UCSB History and Religious Studies departments and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

[Picture: Malian children playing football in a Dogon village. Photo from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mali]

A Culture of Tolerance

By Lisa Curtis, "Reviving Pakistan's Pluralist Traditions to Fight Extremism" - The Heritage Foundation - Washington, DC, USA Monday, May 4, 2009

Pakistan is in the midst of rapid political shifts that are challenging the leadership's ability to maintain cohesion within the country and even raising ques­tions about Pakistan's ability to survive as a viable nation-state over the next few years.

Pakistan has long suffered from ethnic and sectarian divisions. However, the recent threat from a well-armed and well-orga­nized Islamist insurgency pushing to establish strict Islamic law in the entire country, beginning with the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), adds a new and more dangerous dimension to the country's chal­lenges.

Although the collapse of the Pakistani state may not be imminent, as some have recently argued, the government's surrender of the Swat Valley is a major victory for Islamist extremists seeking to carve out pockets of influence within the country.

The establishment of a parallel Islamic courts sys­tem in the Malakand region of the NWFP (including Swat Valley) will have dire human rights conse­quences for average Pakistanis, especially women and girls. The pro-Taliban militants have already destroyed numerous girls' schools and engaged in brutal public punishments to instill fear in the population and quell dissent from their harsh interpretation of Islam.

In early April, Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Ali Chaudhry raised several questions regarding a public flogging of a young woman in Swat. The flogging had been aired on Pakistan's major media outlets, prompt­ing many Pakistanis to express outrage over worsen­ing human rights conditions in the region since the Taliban takeover.

The contrast between the Taliban "justice" and the justice that so many Pakistanis recently demanded in street protests is striking. Pakistanis were jubilant in March 2009 when Chief Justice Chaudhry was rein­stated after he had been unconstitutionally removed two years ago by then-President Pervez Musharraf. Yet the independence of the judiciary that Paki­stanis fought so hard to restore is again at risk—this time from terrorist violence and intimidation.

Swat militant leader Sufi Mohammed's recent criticism of the Pakistani Supreme Court and high courts for not operating under strict Sharia (Islamic law) reveals the militants' broader goal of undermining Pakistan's democratic institutions.

For Pakistan to fend off the growing extremist influence in the country, its leadership will need to do a better job of highlighting the brutality of the pro-Taliban militants. They need to demonstrate that the pro-Taliban insurgents are imposing a way of life on Pakistani citizens that is alien to their own traditions of Islam and aspirations toward constitu­tional democracy. This is Pakistan's fight, but the U.S. can support those Pakistanis seeking to pro­mote religious tolerance and pluralism and to develop a civil society and democratic institutions, including the parliament, judiciary, and free press.

Rise of Militancy Erodes Culture of Tolerance
Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father, envisioned a predominantly Muslim, yet sec­ular and multiethnic democratic state. Indeed, Jin­nah's struggle to achieve independence from the British Empire was a democratic one.

Most South Asian historians agree that the political movement that persuaded the departing British Empire to split the Indian subcontinent into Pakistan and India was colored with religious exclusiveness, but the ultimate goal was not to establish Pakistan as a theocratic state. Jinnah believed that Pakistan, which has a 95 percent Muslim population and is the world's second largest Muslim country, would eventually evolve into a hybrid sys­tem with a benign Sharia guiding civil law decisions on issues, such as mar­riage and inheritance, and a quasi-secular constitution governing all matters involving criminal law, for­eign relations, public policy, and the economy.[1]

After four military dictatorships and several periods of ineffective civilian rule, religious intolerance and support for militancy has increased in Pakistan. The erosion of respect for religious pluralism in Pakistan has been abetted by exclu­sionary laws and the proliferation of minority-hate material in public and private school curriculums. The Pakistan Army's support for militancy as an instrument of foreign policy has also eroded reli­gious tolerance.[2]

Religious and social discrimina­tion against Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shi'ites has led to a threefold increase in reli­gious and sectarian violence between 1980 and 2008. (See Table 1.) [Click to enlarge] The rise in religious intoler­ance is a disturbing trend that will impede Paki­stan's development into a stable democracy and facilitate the rise of Islamist terrorism.

Background
Muhammad Ali Jinnah famously supported reli­gious freedom in his historic speech to the constit­uent assembly in 1947, asking the new Pakistani citizens to feel free "to go to your temples…mosques or any other places of worship in the State of Paki­stan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State."[3]

However, in the years that followed independence from the British, Pakistan's civil and criminal laws and societal norms became more intolerant of religious diversity. In addition to increasing discrimination against religious minori­ties, such as Christians and Sikhs, intra-religious conflicts among Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Ahmadis have also been on the rise.[4]

Several major constitutional and policy milestones in Pakistani history have con­tributed to this backsliding on religious freedom.

Ahmadis: The Ahmadiyya Jamaat has approxi­mately 10 million followers in the world, including approximately 3 million to 4 million in Pakistan. Toward the end of the 19th century, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), founder of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat, broke with centuries-old Islamic dogma by claiming to be an Islamic prophet. (Mainstream Muslims believe that the Prophet Mohammad was the last prophet.) Six years after Pakistan's indepen­dence, Islamists led by Anjuman-i-ahrar-i-Islam (Society of Free Muslims) started a mass movement to declare the Ahmadi sect as non-Muslim and called for the removal of Pakistani Foreign Minister Chaudhry Zafrulla Khan, an Ahmadi follower. Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a prominent Islamist political party, supported the movement by publishing his controversial pam­phlet The Qadiani [Ahmadi] Question and book The Finality of Prophethood.[5] Both argue that Ahmadiyya was an entirely new religion that should not be asso­ciated with Islam.

Twenty years later, in 1974, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto passed a resolution declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims.[6] The legislation barred Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims, calling their places of worship mosques, or worshipping in public prayer rooms open to Muslims. Ahmadis were also prohibited from performing the Muslim call to prayer, using the traditional Islamic greeting in public, or publicly quoting from the Koran.

Military dictator and Islamist-leaning Muham­mad Zia-ul-Haq introduced additional legislation that fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and led to discrimination against religious minori­ties in military service, education, and the civilian bureaucracy.

In 1984, Zia introduced an ordinance that added sections 298(b) and 298(c) to the Paki­stani Penal Code, which made it a crime punishable by up to three years in prison for any Ahmadi to pose as a Muslim or propagate his or her religion as Islam in any forum, including in one's own home. Two years later Zia introduced further restrictions on Ahmadis and non-Muslims by introducing the blasphemy laws under article 295(c), which stated that any person found to have disrespected the Prophet Mohammad or the Koran would face death or life imprisonment.

Over the past two decades, hundreds of Ahmadis have been convicted under the blasphemy laws. The U.S. Department of State reported that at least 25 Ahmadis were arrested on blasphemy charges in 2007. In 2002, Akbar S. Ahmed, an eminent scholar of Islam at American University, received a letter from a death-row inmate awaiting execution under the blasphemy laws. His crime was examin­ing Mohammad's life before he became a prophet.[7]

Christians: While Ahmadis have borne the heaviest religious persecution, Christians have also faced religious intolerance, albeit sporadically. According to the Pakistan Census Organization, 2.8 million Christians live in Pakistan, the majority in Punjab province.[8] There have been numerous inci­dents of violence against Christians and their wor­ship areas. In 2002, Islamist militants attacked a Christian church in Murree, killing seven. The same year 20 worshipers were killed in a church in Taxila.[9] CLAAS, a Pakistani Christian nongovern­mental organization, stated in 2002 that Christians were living under constant fear of their life and prop­erty and that their rights were either curtailed or not protected.[10]

According to the Minority Rights Group International, Pakistan was among the 10 worst of 200 states in violating minority rights. The indepen­dent U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended in its 2008 annual report that the U.S. State Department designate Pakistan a "country of particular concern" because of mounting concerns about religious freedom.[11]

Similar to the Ahmadis, Christians have faced legal persecution under the blasphemy laws, the Hudood Ordinance,[12] and the Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence). Under these laws the govern­ment has the right to regulate social behavior inside and outside the home, including intimate matters such as extramarital sex and crimes such as rape. While Muslim women also face discrimination under these laws, women from minority groups face the dual obstacles of religion and gender. In practice under the Hudood Ordinance, a non-Muslim's tes­timony is not equal to a Muslim's testimony, and two women are equal to one man in rape cases.

The 2006 Women's Protection Bill signed by former President Musharraf marked a major mile­stone in rolling back discriminatory legislation by shifting cases of rape and adultery from Sharia courts to secular courts and by amending the Hudood Ordinance. Musharraf also ordered the release of 2,500 women imprisoned under the Hudood Ordinance. Some of the cases against the women will now be heard under the Women's Pro­tection Bill.

Musharraf's government passed the Women's Protection Bill with the support of his political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam); the Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians, the party of the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; and other smaller parties. The law was consistent with Mush­arraf's policy of social liberalism and reversed some of Zia-ul-Haq's Islamist laws. However, Musharraf was unable to fully repeal the Hudood Ordinance because of pressure from the religious parties. Musharraf also encouraged a burgeoning media, music, and film industry that has strengthened sup­port for a more open and progressive society.

Parallel Legal Systems
To fully understand the anti-Ahmadi, blasphemy, and Hudood laws requires understanding Pakistan's complex legal system. Pakistan has had three major constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973). The current one has survived the longest, albeit with significant amendments and incidents of abeyances. Articles 20, 21, 22, 25, and 36 protect minority rights and the freedom to practice and preach all religions.

However, in the late 1970s different variations of Sharia were introduced, challenging Pakistan's Brit­ish common law. Zia-ul-Haq introduced a parallel legal system that created Sharia benches in all high courts to declare any law disrespectful of Islam as unconstitutional. In 1985, a separate electorate sys­tem was created in which non-Muslims could vote only for candidates of their own religion. President Musharraf overturned this law at the local level for some reserved seats, but non-Muslims are still barred from voting for Muslim candidates who run in the general elections. The parallel legal system also continues with a Federal Shariat Court and Sharia bench inside the Supreme Court often com­peting against secular courts in civil, criminal, and Islamic jurisprudence.

The Federal Shariat Court, created in 1980, has jurisdiction to challenge any decision by a secular court, a provincial legislature, or the national legis­lature that violates "the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah"[13] or relates to the Hudood Ordinance and anti-blasphemy laws. This gives the Shariat Court tremendous power and leeway in interpreting laws. In practice, however, the Shariat Court has only occasionally interfered with the secular courts. One of the most famous clashes occurred in 2005 when a Lahore High Court's decision in favor of Mukhtar Mai, a gang rape victim, was suspended by the Federal Shariat Court.[14] After strong international and national pressure from lawyers and human rights activists, the Supreme Court eventually stepped in and upheld the Lahore High Court's decision.

On other occasions when Christians, Ahmadis, or Shi'ites are charged with defaming or disrespecting the Koran or Sunnah, the Shariat Court has stepped in and offered an opinion. For example, in 2007, the Shariat Court sentenced Younis Masih, a Pakistani Christian, to death under the anti-blasphemy laws. Masih was reportedly tortured in jail, while his law­yer survived an assassination plot.[15] The Supreme Court eventually overturned the verdict.

Pakistani Shi'ites are also not immune to the anti-blasphemy laws. In May 2007, a district judge in Karachi convicted several Shi'ites after their neigh­bors registered cases against them under the anti-blasphemy laws. The judge stated that he gave the judgment under death threats from Islamist clergy­men waiting outside the courthouse.[16]

There is a debate over whether the Federal Shar­iat Court's influence will increase as Pakistan con­tinues to grapple with strengthening its fragile democratic institutions, including the judiciary. Created to control social, economic, and political behavior of citizens under strict Islamic law, the Shariat Court has failed to win battles against the more powerful Supreme Court. For example, it could not stop passage of the 2006 Women Protec­tion Bill or the continuation of riba (interest) in the Pakistani banking system. The 2007 secular law­yers' movement, which became a determining fac­tor in President Musharraf's political decline and eventual resignation, provided no voice to Sharia-imposing lawyers and backed Pakistan's predomi­nantly secular constitution.

Intrareligious Discrimination: Sunni vs. Shi'ites
Around 25 percent of Pakistan's Muslims are Shi'ites, giving Pakistan the world's second largest Shi'a population, after Iran. The difference between Sunnis and Shi'ites is one of interpretation and the right to lead the Muslim community.[17]

Many Sunni hardliners in Pakistan would like to declare Shi'ites as non-Muslims, just as the Ahmadis. In fact, sec­tarianism in Pakistan has its roots in the anti-Ahmadi movement. For example, the head of Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SeP, a Sunni terrorist group) began his career in the late 1970s opposing the Ahmadis.[18]

Sunni–Shia sectarian violence has claimed more than 4,000 lives since the late 1980s.[19] Retaliatory assassinations of Sunni and Shia leaders have started long-lasting blood feuds that spread across rural and urban areas of Pakistan. Growing Taliban influence in parts of the North West Frontier Prov­ince and tribal border areas is also contributing to increased sectarian violence in these regions. In Dera Ismail Khan, which borders the tribal areas, 540 Shi'ites have died in sectarian violence since 2006. Sectarian violence also erupted in the Kurram agency of the tribal border areas in 2007, killing 548 Shi'ites. The government responded with aggressive diplomacy with local tribal Sunni and Shia leaders and was able to quell the violence by mid-2008.

Analysts believe incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan are increasingly committed by Sunni militants inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology.[20] According to a Daily Times report in 2007, an al-Qaeda operative in Peshawar killed Shia leader Syed Ali Imam Jafri.

Teaching Intolerance
While observers agree that scrapping some of Pakistan's draconian laws, such as the blasphemy laws, will help to reduce religious intolerance, they also point to Pakistan's education system as a major contributor to the overall problem. The U.S. State Department observes in its 2008 International Religious Freedom Report that "[t]he public school curriculum included derogatory remarks in text­books against minority religious groups, particu­larly Hindus and Jews."[21]

Pakistani professor Pervez Hoodbhoy recently noted, "Pakistan's education system demands that Islam be understood as a complete code of life, and creates in the mind of the schoolchild a sense of siege and constant embattlement by stressing Islam is under threat everywhere."[22] Public education reform, especially curriculum reform, is essential.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has requested $163 million to support Pakistan's education sector,[23] but not for curricu­lum reform—a sensitive topic for any country. USAID education programs help to educate teach­ers, provide input on education policy reforms, improve enrollment, provide facilities in schools, and equip parents and siblings with basic literacy.

Any genuine effort to reform the curriculum must come from within Pakistan.

The real engine for hate material against religious minorities comes from a wide net of radical madras­sahs (Islamic religious seminaries) spread through­out Pakistan, including the cities of Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, and Islamabad and the Federally Adminis­tered Tribal Areas (FATA). Reforming the curricu­lum of these madrassahs must be at the center of any Pakistani effort to eradicate religious discrimi­nation. A number of these madrassahs are financed and operated by Pakistani Islamist parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), and by Pakistani expatriates and other foreign entities, including many in Saudi Arabia.[24]

Sunni Schools of Thought in Pakistan
The several Sunni schools of thought in Pakistan range across a spectrum in terms of their tolerance for other religions and varying interpretations and religious practices within Sunni Islam. An increas­ingly important question in Pakistan is how the government's democratic institutions, namely the judiciary, will deal with issues that raise questions about the relationship of basic human rights to interpretations of Islamic law and religious prac­tices. The main Sunni schools of thought include Barelvi, Deoband, and Ahl-e-Hadith.

Barelvi: The Barelvis were founded by Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilli (1856–1921). Most Paki­stanis adhere to this school of thought, which also draws from Sufi traditions. Barelvis appeal through saints and venerate graves and share a special respect and connection with shrines of Sufi saints.[25]

Sufism has strong links to South Asia dating back to the eighth and ninth century and preaches religious tolerance, encourages spiritual over ritualistic practicing of Islam, and encour­ages diversity. Sufi shrines attract the majority of Pakistanis, but are also under constant attack from the Deobandi, Wahabi, Salafi, and Ahl-e-Hadith sects (and more recently by Taliban mili­tants). President Asif Ali Zardari has noted the importance of Sufi shrines to Pakistani traditions of Islam and has made efforts to restore and repair them and to empower their leadership.[26]

Deoband: Deobandis are closely linked with a religiously intolerant interpretation of Islam and have established several hundred Islamic seminaries in Pakistan, many of which abet militancy.[27] This Sunni sect originated in the city of Deoband in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, where the largest Deoband madrassah still operates. Deobandism was a reformist movement that developed in reaction to British colonialism and from the belief among Mus­lim theologians that British influence on the Indian subcontinent was corrupting the religion of Islam.

The Deobandis solidified a puritanical perspective toward Islam for South Asian Muslims, much as the Wahhabis and Salafis have done in present-day Saudi Arabia. Some Deobandi Islamic schools engage in sectarian militancy by encouraging and facilitating anti-Shia sectarian groups, such as Lash­kar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and SeP.

On June 2, 2008, Darul Uloom, a Deoband madrassah in India, issued a fatwa (Islamic edict) against terrorism calling it "the most inhumane crime." Pakistan political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), which is ideologically linked to Darul Uloom, endorsed the fatwa.[28] Darul Uloom is one of the most important Islamic schools in the world, but has become notorious in recent years because many Pakistani extremist groups and the Taliban claim to be Deobandi adherents.

Schol­ars of Islam have pointed out that a significant divide separates Deobandi scholars and clerics from mili­tant groups such as the Taliban. Observers say the Taliban has oversimplified the original Deobandi teachings and note that Deobandis living in India support the secular government, while the Taliban support a violent anti-state agenda.[29]

Ahl-e-Hadith: The Ahl-e-Hadith share most of the Deobandi beliefs and trace their origins to 19th-century Bhopal (present-day India). In addition to rejecting heterodox beliefs, Ahl-e-Hadith strongly support the notion of jihad (participation in mili­tary campaigns designed to defend Muslim nations against non-Muslims).[30] Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based terrorist group responsible for the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, subscribes to the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought. The Ahl-e-Hadith tradition is the South Asian variant of the theological tradition motivating core al-Qaeda ideo­logues.[31] The Ahl-e-Hadith were represented in the most recent Pakistani national parliament (2002– 2007) under an umbrella of religious parties.

The Ahl-e-Hadith madrassahs emphasize the Koran and Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) and oppose folk Islam and practices, such as celebrating the anniversaries of saints or distributing food on religious occasions.[32]

Talibanization and the Swat Valley Peace Deal
Islamabad's decision to allow a parallel Islamic court system in the Malakand Division of the NWFP demonstrates the weakness of the Pakistan govern­ment and military against Taliban-backed extrem­ists who seek to take over parts of the province. The government's capitulation to the Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) in the Swat Valley fol­lowing its campaign of violence and intimidation— which included shuttering dozens of girls' schools, murdering women who declined to stop working, and publicly beheading accused spies—has raised concern in Washington about the Pakistani state's ability to stop Talibanization in the province.

The recent closing of the civil courts in Swat Val­ley has belied the government's earlier claim that establishing Islamic courts in the region would not usurp state authority. TNSM Chief Sufi Mohammad declared the civil courts were against Sharia and asked civil judges not to hold court. He also declared in a recent interview that democracy is not permissible under Sharia law.

The Madrassahs: Breeding Grounds for Religious Intolerance
Many of the Deoband and Ahl-e-Hadith madras­sahs in Pakistan support militancy and foster a way of thinking that leads to acts of terrorism. Even madrassahs that do not openly support militancy continue to teach concepts of religious intolerance that fuel extremism. In a survey of 488 10th-grade Pakistani students in public, private, and madrassah schools, Tariq Rahman explored the propensity of madrassah curriculum toward violence.[33]

According to the survey results, madrassah stu­dents show a tendency toward sectarian and gender intolerance and a preference toward militancy to resolve contentious issues such as Kashmir. When madrassah students were asked if they supported an open war with India to solve the Kashmir matter, 60 percent responded in the affirmative. In sharp con­trast, 65 percent of students in the private schools answered negatively. When asked about militancy in Kashmir, 53 percent of madrassah students sup­ported militancy, compared to only 22 percent of private school students. The results were similar in the categories of sectarian, gender, and religious tol­erance. This study demonstrates a broad-based con­nection between madrassah education and the propensity toward gender, religious, and sectarian intolerance and militant violence.

A study by Saleem Ali supports Tariq Rahman's survey in making a connection between madrassahs and religious militancy. Ali concentrated his work on Ahmedpur, a rural area in east Punjab province with a substantial concentration of madrassahs and a history of sectarian violence. According to Ali, Ahmedpur is the birthplace of Harkat-ul-Ansar and Jaish-e-Mohammad, which are Deoband Kashmir-focused, Sunni sectarian terrorist organizations that have targeted Westerners. Ahmedpur has 363 madrassahs, of which 98 percent are Sunni and more than 50 percent are Deobandi. Only 11 per­cent are registered with the federal govern­ment.[34] Ali calculated that more than half were actively involved in sectarian militancy.

These two studies identify strong links between interreligious and intrareligious violence. While madrassah reform is essential, broad-based inter­faith harmony initiatives by the Pakistani govern­ment can also help to create an environment that will facilitate reforms. A good example is the Pakistani government's backing of the Allama Inayat Ali Shakir's organization, Tehrik-e-Akhuwat-e-Islami (Movement for the Brotherhood of Islam), which conducts seminars, conferences, and workshops on interfaith cooperation. The organization has recently worked with the Council of Islamic Ideol­ogy and religious parties toward a joint declaration against religious discrimination and using religion to justify terrorism.

Policy Recommendations
Reversing the trends toward religious intolerance and extremism in Pakistan will take strong leader­ship and commitment from both the military estab­lishment and civilian politicians. The military's support for religious extremists to achieve its for­eign policy objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India has had far-reaching negative consequences for Pakistani society and the country's stability. Con­tinued links between Islamist extremists and retired military and intelligence officials has led to confu­sion within the security establishment about the genuine threat to the nation's future.

In turn, the security establishment's ambivalence toward extremist groups fuels conspiracy theories against outsiders (mainly India or the U.S.), which are aired in the Pakistani media and lead to a public discourse that plays down the terrorist threat. To survive as a unified and stable institution, the Paki­stan Army needs to fully break its links with extrem­ist groups and rein in individuals who are pressing an Islamist agenda.

In the current environment of Islamist terrorism, Pakistani secular politicians are often powerless to bring change for fear of violent retaliation. The assas­sination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, is a stark example of the dan­gerous forces currently at play in Pakistan. The NWFP government's capitulation to the pro-Taliban forces in the Swat Valley is another example of the violent intimidation of secular forces in the country. Prior to the Swat Valley agreement, several Awami National Party politicians, including party leader Asfandyar Wali Khan, were targeted for assassination.

Until the security situation improves in Paki­stan, politicians and civil society leaders will have difficulty making bold policy moves to increase religious tolerance and freedom. However, civilians can begin to effect change at the grassroots level through smaller-scale initiatives. The U.S. should support local leaders seeking to promote religious pluralism and find ways to program more aid toward such endeavors.

In this environment, the U.S. should:

Support development of civil society and democratic institutions. The U.S. should strongly support the development of Pakistan's democratic institutions, including the parlia­ment, judiciary, and free press. Steps to increase non-military aid to Pakistan are welcome and will contribute to strengthening civil society and civil institutions, which should facilitate freer discourse on issues of religious freedom and plu­ralism. The lawyers' movement has attuned the Pakistani people to the importance of a free judi­ciary as a cornerstone of democracy. Pakistanis' excitement for establishing a freer and stronger judiciary should also catalyze discussions on individual liberty and religious freedom.

The U.S. appears to have played the role of honest broker in encouraging the Zardari government to reinstate the country's top justice, thereby defus­ing a public confrontation between the govern­ment and opposition led by Nawaz Sharif. It is crucial that the U.S. continue to deemphasize relationships with individual Pakistani leaders and instead consistently support the develop­ment of Pakistani democratic institutions.

Support Pakistani efforts to form a public–pri­vate education watchdog agency.Religious intolerance declines when a community nurtures a culture of tolerance. While laws, civil society organizations, and a break from discriminatory practices and traditions is significant, any long-term impact on religious tolerance in Pakistan will require changing the curriculum of public and private schools, especially the madrassahs. The system of federal, provincial, and local boards of education that manages and implements curric­ulums in public schools, colleges, and universities— including the federal board for madrassahs—lacks the resources, coordination, accountability, and clear guidance to implement a liberal, yet cultur­ally sensitive educational philosophy.

With U.S. support, Pakistan could create an independent nonpartisan public–private education watchdog agency to monitor public education. The agency could coordinate federal, provincial, and local efforts to purge religious and ethnic hate material from the national curriculum.

Support nongovernmental efforts to promote religious tolerance and pluralism. U.S. officials should recognize and support important work by nongovernmental organizations in promoting religious pluralism. For example, the LibforAll Foundation has done groundbreaking work in Indonesia by building networks among educa­tors, religious leaders, celebrities, and opinion leaders in promoting religious pluralism. This approach could also be applied in Pakistan.

The U.S.-based International Center for Religion and Diplomacy has been conducting a Madrassah Enhancement Program, which encourages Paki­stani madrassahs to expand their curriculum to include the social and scientific disciplines, with an emphasis on religious tolerance and human rights. It also seeks to motivate madrassah leaders to use religious principles in peacefully resolving conflict.

Speak out against cases of religious persecu­tion and repression and oppose punishment for religion-related offenses, such as apostasy or blasphemy. In 2005, the international atten­tion on the case of Mukhtar Mai, a Pakistani woman who was gang-raped as part of an honor settlement for a tribal dispute, likely contributed to the Musharraf government's decision to pass the Women's Protection Bill of 2006. Raising the profile of cases involving religious intolerance and persecution in Pakistan can spotlight policy and legal deficiencies in the system that contrib­ute to religious intolerance. U.S. officials should not shy away from raising public concern over cases of religious intolerance or persecution as a matter of principle.

Integrate policies promoting religious toler­ance into Pakistan's counterinsurgency policy. In the past two years, sectarian violence fanned by Taliban and Sunni extremist groups linked to al-Qaeda has increased in Pakistan's northwest, notably in the Kurram agency and Dera Ismail Khan and Tank districts. Through aggressive diplomacy and brute force, the Pakistani military has brokered temporary ceasefires, but sustain­able peace depends on implementing a long-term multifaceted counterinsurgency campaign. The clear, hold, and build school of counterinsur­gency advocates a three-step policy of winning the population over by providing security (clear­ing), managing governance (holding), and creat­ing socioeconomic opportunities (building). After succeeding on the first two steps, the Pakistani military also needs to push education reform to fight religious intolerance in Pakistan's northwest and to reduce future terrorist recruitment.

Conclusion
One of the most important ways to fight Islamist extremism is to demonstrate the importance of respect for other religious traditions and the bene­fits to society of developing a culture of religious freedom and pluralism. The Pakistani people have a deep culture of pluralist traditions dating back cen­turies, which their founding leader sought to pre­serve in order to strengthen Pakistan as a nation-state, while maintaining the country's Muslim iden­tity.

Pakistanis need to nurture this pluralist, toler­ant tradition in order to stabilize and develop the country as it faces extremists that wish to destroy Pakistan's South Asian identity, retard overall growth and development, and isolate the country from the global community.

Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. Haider A. H. Mullick is Senior Fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University and Research Associate at Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford.

Footnotes:
[1]Pakistan is an Islamic republic. Islam is the state religion, and its constitution requires that laws be consistent with Islam.

[2]Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy, "Towards Theocracy?" Frontline, March 14–27, 2009, at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2606/stories/20090327260601600.htm (April 27, 2009).

[3]See Muhammad Ali Jinnah, address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, August 11, 1947, at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html (April 27, 2009).

[4]According to Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2007, Pakistan had a score of 6 on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the highest level and 10 being the lowest level of religious freedom in the world. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007, s.v. "Pakistan," at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7247&year=2007 (April 27, 2009).

[5]Ibid.

[6]Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 260, at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution (April 27, 2009).

[7]Akbar S. Ahmed, "Pakistan's Blasphemy Law: Words Fail Me," The Washington Post, May 19, 2002, p. B1, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36108-2002May17 (April 27, 2009).

[8]Shaun Gregory, "The Christian Minority in Pakistan: Issues and Options," University of Bradford (U.K.), Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief No. 37, July 17, 2008, p. 4, at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/ Brief+37.pdf (April 27, 2009).

[9]Azaz Syed, "56 Suicide Attacks Occurred Since 2002," The Daily Times (India), October 22, 2007, at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\10\22\story_22-10-2007_pg7_24 (April 27, 2009).

[10]Nasir Saeed, "Faith Under Fire," CLAAS-UK, 2002, p. 17, quoted in Gregory, "The Christian Minority in Pakistan," p. 13.

[11]U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2008, May 2008, pp. 7 and 146–153, at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/AR2008/annual%20report%202008-final%20edition.pdf (April 29, 2009).

[12]The Hudood Ordinance was enacted under General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law regime in 1979 to legislate the moral behavior of citizens—such as extramarital sex, rape, theft, and prohibition of alcohol—under strict Islamic law. For an authoritative study, see Katherine M. Weaver, "Women's Rights and Sharia Law: A Workable Reality? An Examination of Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through the Continuing Reform of the Pakistani Hudood Ordinance," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 2007), p. 483,at http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?17+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int%27l+L.+483 (April 27, 2009).

[13]Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 227 (1).

[14]"Shariat Court on Mai Case: Defense Counsel Criticizes Decision," The Daily Times, March 13, 2005, at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_13-3-2005_pg7_27 (April 27, 2009).

[15]Amnesty International, "Pakistan: Further Information on Death Threats/Fear for Safety/Possible Death Penalty/Prisoner of Conscience. New Concern: Death Penalty," June 18, 2007, at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA33/012/2007/en (April 27, 2009).

[16]Editorial, "‘Islamic' Laws Gone Wrong," The Daily Times, May 29, 2007, at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\05\29\story_29-5-2007_pg3_1 (April 27, 2009).

[17]In early Islamic history, the Shi'ites were a political faction that supported the power of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammed and the fourth Caliph (spiritual ruler) of the Muslim community. Ali was murdered in 661 AD and replaced by his chief opponent, Muawiya, leading to the schism between Sunnis and Shi'ites.

[18]Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shiia and Sunni Identities," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, Issue 3 (July 1998), p. 642.

[19]Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2007, p. 105, at http://www.hrcp-web.org/hrcpDetail_pub3.cfm?proId=528 (April 27, 2009).

[20]Alastair Lawson, "Pakistan's Evolving Sectarian Schism," BBC News, February 20, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7901094.stm (April 27, 2009).

[21]U.S. Department of State, 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom, s.v. Pakistan, September 2008, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108505.htm (April 29, 2009).

[22]Hoodbhoy, "Towards Theocracy?"

[23]U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2009, p. 588, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101468.pdf (April 29, 2009).

[24]K. Alan Kronstadt, "Education Reform in Pakistan," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 23, 2004, at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/40145.pdf (April 28, 2009).

[25]See Christine C. Fair, The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008).

[26]Amar Guriro, "Skeletons in Cupboard," The Daily Times, November 25, 2008.

[27]See S. M. Khalid, Deeni madaaris main taleem (Education in religious schools) (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2002).

[28]Zakir Hussnain, "JUI-F Endorses Indian Madrassa Fatwa," The Daily Times, June 5, 2008.

[29]Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 139–140.

[30]The term "jihad" can also apply to a Muslim's inner struggle against his/her own immoral desires.

[31]C. Christine Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai," testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, March 11, 2009, at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20090311141119-80354.pdf (April 27, 2009).

[32]Lisa Curtis, "U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism Through Education Reform," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1029, June 8, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl1029.cfm.

[33]Tariq Rahman, "Pluralism and Intolerance in Pakistani Society: Attitudes of Pakistani Students Towards the Religious ‘Other,'" 2007, p. 29, at http://www.tariqrahman.net/language/Pluralism%20and%20Intolerance%20in%20Pakistani%20Society.htm (April 30, 2009).

[34]Saleem H. Ali, "Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassahs of Pakistan," unpublished working draft, University of Vermont, retrieved December 14, 2007, p. 69.

With a Sufi Perspective

By Sertaç Sehlikoğlu Karakaş, "Religious-secularist mix impacts women's rights in Turkey" - Common Ground News - Washington, DC, USA/Bruxelles, Belgium
Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Montréal, Canada: Turkey has strong ties both with its Muslim history and with secularism, understood as not mixing religion with politics.

After decades of struggling between these two identities, this strategic NATO ally and EU contender has developed a hybrid identity that encompasses both. As a result, Turkey has been increasingly perceived as a liberal and progressive face of Islam on the global stage and, in congruence with the true spirit of the religion, it is demonstrating its commitment to the empowerment of women.

In order to positively affect women's daily lives, it will take engaged leadership by religious scholars and feminists in addition to government-initiated reforms.

The Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA), the government institution overseeing religious matters since it was established in 1924, and the highest Islamic authority in Turkey, is at the centre of the debate on religion and women. The PRA – which currently employs approximately 83,000 clerics in local mosques – was originally limited to the administration of mosques, but now focuses more on developing new interpretations of Islam.

Recently, the PRA initiated a review of hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) which was well-received by Turkish society and reverberated beyond national borders.

According to the PRA's explanation, the project's aim is to raise awareness about the inaccuracy of apocryphal hadiths accumulated after the death of the Prophet Muhammad by re-emphasising the importance of morally credible and viable sources. For example, many cultural traditions that were considered unfair to women were wrongly attributed to the Prophet and were added to hadith collections even though their chains of transmission were flawed.

The project is expected to yield a collection of hadiths on women combined in a five-volume publication. Its aim is to support women's rights activists in their fight against "honour" killings, violence against women and misogyny in general.

In addition, since 2005, the PRA has also offered its female employees the opportunity to upgrade their educational and professional skills so that they become better qualified for higher-ranking positions.

According to Ali Bardakoğlu, president of the PRA, the institution has suffered from a lack of women's contributions for decades. The PRA's goal in recent years has been to promote women to the highest levels of the institution, which Bardakoğlu hopes to accomplish by gradually incorporating them into the PRA structure. Women will be promoted to positions of assistant cleric, cleric and mufti (an official scholar of Islamic law).

Bardakoğlu does not deny that men have thus far been more influential within Islamic institutions, but states that the absence of women in such positions has been due to their lack of higher education – a reality that can be changed.

Despite the women-friendly attitude and speeches of Bardakoğlu, parts of the institution appear reluctant to change.

Soon after the PRA's declaration in 2005, which announced its intent to hire 200 new female preachers and appoint women as muftis and vice-muftis, a member of the institution authored an article on how women should behave around men so as not to arouse men's sexual desire. Thanks to a vigilant feminist response, the article was removed from the PRA's website and the institute issued an apology.

Strong female criticism – both from those outside the institution and those within it – is essential to holding the PRA to its goal of empowering women.

Feminists continue to push the PRA to implement and institutionalise initiatives that are more inclusive of women. Over the last four years, the PRA has successfully implemented target quotas for women in higher level positions – seven women have already been appointed to the position of vice-mufti – and established bureaus in 21 cities across the country to address concerns of local women.

The drive towards greater empowerment of women in Turkey has affected not only women's representation in the PRA, but also society more broadly.

The well-known religious leader Fethullah Gulen wrote an article in the Turkish newspaper, Zaman, in September 2008 on the topic of domestic violence. He stated that a woman should be brave enough to take legal action against her husband if she is beaten.

Gulen referenced a newer interpretation of religious texts with a Sufi perspective to support his advice. Gulen explained that in the case of domestic violence the husband should be perceived as zalim, meaning tyrannical, and judged guilty of exercising unjust power.

Such interpretations can give women the legal backing to press criminal charges against their husbands, or to achieve monetary retribution for mistreatment.

His comments provide invaluable scholarly justification for the many women who have long been advocating similar views.

Developing modern religious interpretations to address women's issues provides a rich and strong foundation for feminist discourses. The PRA has made significant progress in developing modern and accurate religious interpretations generally and specifically on the subject of women.

Though Muslim women still have a long way to go to achieve the rights due to them in Islam, the PRA's reforms – including giving women access to clerical positions and the prevalence of new interpretations of religious sources – are slowly paving the road to empowerment.

Feminists are prompting many of these changes in religious interpretation. In turn, strengthening women's rights by referencing religion provides guidelines for women living in other Muslim countries, a project which is consistent with Turkey's mission to become a model of a modern Muslim country.

Sertaç Sehlikoğlu Karakaş is a women's rights activist and member of the non-profit organisation Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML). She is currently pursuing graduate studies in anthropology at the University of Toronto.

This article is part of a series on Muslim women and their religious rights written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).

[Click on the title of this article to go to the original and the whole series of articles]

A Beautiful Sound

TT Art Desk, "Hafez Nazeri to accompany dad at Paris concert with new setar" - Tehran Times - Tehran, Iran

Hafez Nazeri, the son of vocalist Shahram Nazeri, is to accompany his dad with his new instrument “Hafez” at the Paris concert

In a press conference held on Thursday, father and son as well as conductor Loris Tjeknavorian attended. Hafez (Nazeri) gave some details about the new instrument.

“During the time I was in the United States giving solo performances with the setar, I discovered that this instrument needed changes in its pitch and bass range.”

“I felt the necessity for changes due to innovations that have occurred in playing techniques over the years. It was in 2002 I developed two modified designs for setar and patented them in the U.S,” he said.

Hafez noted that he actually did not intend to design a new instrument, since Iranian music does not require it, adding, “The only change in this new setar is that it has a flatter handle and two additional strings which allow the addition of 10 new notes to its range. On choosing the name Hafez, he said, “It was not just because my first name is Hafez. The major thing is that the word hafez means to preserve (oral heritage and music) and on the other hand it bears the great name of the Persian poet Hafez.”

“I am not a musical instrument maker but rather, I am a musician who is interested in the beauty of the music. When I drew up the design, I showed it to the brothers Majid and Saeid Safari who built over 15 instruments and we finally settled on this design,” he explained.

Shahram Nazeri was next to talk and said, “Despite some who disagree with any change in traditional music, I agree with new experiments. Perhaps others feel that traditional music is a divine entity bestowed upon us and hence, there should be no changes made to it. I respect their ideas, but there are other dynamic individuals who want to experience new ideas, using their creativity.”

“I myself always made changes in singing. I believe the destination is not important, what is important is the route one takes. Maybe it will turn out to be a winner, maybe it won’t. On the whole, experiencing the innovative is a good omen,” he mentioned.

Tjeknavorian continued and said that he agrees with Shahram Nazeri, saying, “I never liked to stick with old traditions for their own sake. On the whole, when you wake up every morning, you should learn something from old tradition and then find a creative, new way to apply it.”

On the characteristics of the new instrument, he said, “I am so happy to get to know Hafez (Nazeri). We also both recently recorded one song in London which was a wonderful experience.”

“I congratulate Hafez for his work. The instrument has a beautiful sound and I hope I can write a concerto for this special instrument. The sound I heard from this instrument was what I recall hearing from the setar of master Ahmad Ebadi. This sound should not change and should remain as it is,” he commented.

Shahram Nazeri later talked about his concert in Paris and said, “Hafez and I are holding a concert at the Salle Pleyel hall in Paris on May 16 and will be accompanied by Azerbaijan’s great singer Alim Qasimov and his daughter Fargana. This is the first time two singers from the East are giving performances together.”

The New Setar

TE/HGH, "Iran's Hafez Nazeri unveils new Setar" - Press TV - Tehran, Iran
Friday, May 1, 2009

Iranian musician Hafez Nazeri has unveiled his new Persian string instrument which is believed to be a developed form of the Setar.

“The new Setar is easier to tune, and has a larger body and two more strings that give it additional sound volume,” Nazeri told a press conference in Tehran.

“I did not want to create a thoroughly new instrument, because I believe Persian music only needs to be developed and all we have to do is to perfect our traditional instruments,” he added.

Nazeri registered the design for his new instrument, called Hafez, in the US in 2000 and claims to have designed 20 new instruments so far. Hafez has been made by Majid and Saeed Safari, who according to Nazeri have worked on it every day for the past year.

Son of prominent vocalist and musician Shahram Nazeri, Hafez has been playing Tambour, Setar and Daf since young. Hafez has accompanied his father in numerous international music festivals and has performed in many others, including Belgium's Sfinks, Italy's Festa del Popolo, France's Theatre de la Ville and Lebanon's Beiteddine festivals.

He has also received a UCLA creativity award for most distinguished young composer and the Irvine City Hall Award of Distinction in Kurdish music for his contributions to spreading through music mystic Persian poet Mowlavi's spiritual message of peace.

San Diego County named February 25, 2006 the 'Hafez Nazeri Day' and he has been invited to lecture at Emory University and Harvard where he was honored for his efforts and innovations in Persian music.

Hafez Nazeri has also received a recognition award from the US Congress.

Delighted to Do It

Staff Report, "Sufi Music Festival kicks off at Peeru’s Café" - Daily Times - Lahore, Pakistan
Saturday, May 2, 2009

Saeen Zahoor sings with passion, captivates audience

Lahore: The sixth annual International Mystic Music Sufi Festival kicked off on Thursday night amid tight security at Peeru’s Cafe with folk and Sufi performances.

Crowds of people were present in the spacious lawn adjacent to the cafe, where the stage was set for the performances of the Sufi singers. The stage was designed intricately and depicted tombs in the background to match the soul of the Sufi festival.

A wide area was left vacant in front of the stage. The open-air venue added to the charm of the festival. Security personnel and plainclothesmen were deployed outside as well as inside the cafe. A walk-through gate was also set up outside the venue to search people before letting them inside.

Zahoor’s performance
Saeen Zahoor’s performances stole the show on the first night and made the audience stand on their toes. Zahoor sang with passion and captivated the audience. The sincerity and the heat in his voice touched the soul.

Wearing a multicoloured dress, bright coloured chapal (shoes) and holding a musical instrument in his hands, Zahoor aesthetically danced during his singing.

“Sufism gives the message of peace, love and harmony. Listening and singing of Sufi songs provides the listener with an energy that curbs hatred and malice,” he said.

Goonga Saeen and Mitthu Saeen delighted the audience with their drumbeats. Hanging a drum in his neck, Goonga whirled in circles at rapid speeds. People cheered the performance.

Zar Sanga, Mehboob Farid Qawal and Fakir Abdul Wahid Jamal also performed and received the audiences’ applause.

Rafi Peer Theatre Workshop (RPTW) Media Director Tasneem Peerzada said in these days it was important to keep up the tradition of organising cultural activities and RPTW was delighted to do it.

She said Sufi festivals had their own circle of audience.

Food stalls were also established at the festival and people satiated their hunger by visiting them.

Detailed Profiles

By Suanshu Khurana, "Sufi Potpourri" - Express India - India
Saturday, May 2, 2009

The legendary Amir Khusro’s verse set to strains of Sufi music was the appropriate backdrop for the launch of Sadia Dehlvi’s book, Sufism: The Heart of Islam (HarperCollins), held at Delhi’s Le Meridien on Thursday.

The book provides insight into the lives of great Sufi mystics like Baba Bulleshah, Baba Farid, Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti apart from a range of poetry written by them.

“The book would have been incomplete without these detailed profiles that had a huge impact on people converting to Islam. Since song and dance is such an integral part of Sufism, their poetry adds depth to the book,” said Dehlvi.

In the book, she has lucidly described the Sufi path with an interesting assessment of Sufism’s connect with Muslim and non Muslim societies, in turn also highlighting the widespread misunderstanding about Sufism as a faith which separates it from Islam. “Sufism is not an innovation but a continuation of Islam that leads to the Prophet,” she added.

“Sadia’s transformation is commendable. Her perspective on Sufism and spirituality is unique,” said author Khushwant Singh. Professor Mushirul Hasan, VC of Jamia Milia Islamia, launched the book along with Singh, while artists Arpana Caur and Sudhir Dar looked on.

[Book Cover from the Publisher website: http://www.harpercollins.co.in/BookList.asp?Classification=Yes]

Ahl-e Dil اهل دل

By Sadia Dhelvi, "Spiritual current that flows through Islam" - The Times Of India - India
Friday, May 1st, 2009

What has Sufism got to do with Islam? I realise that Islam is perceived as a faith with harsh laws, whereas Sufism represents wonderful poetry, dance, art and an appealing form of universal love.

It is difficult for some Muslims and most non-Muslims to accept that Sufism is the spiritual current that flows through Islam. Sufi Masters are called ahl-e-dil, 'people of the heart'.

They teach that religion has no meaning unless warmed by emotions of love, and interpret Sufism as being the heart of Islam. However, I do understand that Sufism has come to mean something quite different in the language of the New Age. Disillusioned with religion and the problems associated with it in secular democratic societies, people tend to mix and match elements from various religious traditions that personally appeal to them...

I have attempted to explain how Islam and Sufism are inseparable. The Qur'an informs us that Islam is not something that began with prophet Muhammad some 1400 years ago, but with the creation of the universe in which Adam was the first Prophet. Sufism is the timeless art of awakening the higher consciouness through submission to the Divine Will.

The Sufi doctrine goes far beyond history and is rooted in the primordial covenant all unborn souls made with their Creator... Sufism essentially consists of a path that teaches how to free oneself from the ego and rise to higher spiritual levels. The road is endless and how far one wishes to travel is largely a matter of personal choice. The Sufi way contains a method of guidance and transformation that is not an easy route...

I learnt that Islam was clearly about moderation and reflection, and how Prophet Muhammad had warned us of extremism... The Qur'an reminds us that mercy and compassion are the foremost of Allah's attributes.

The answers to many issues facing Muslim communities can be found in revisiting the scholarship of the Sufis. These Masters have established traditions of knowledge transmission that go back all the way to Prophet Muhammad who said, 'Pass on knowledge from me even if it is only one verse'...

My Sufi Master Shah Muhammad Farooq Rahmani... emphasised that Sufis are torch-bearers to the path of righteousness. He believed that for those unable to seek the sohbat, company of Sufis, reading and being aware about their life and teachings are blessings.

The mystic began each discourse with the words, 'Those who are true in their intent, those who have complete faith and those who seek the Truth are the ones who successfully achieve their goal'. He lamented that the biographers of the Sufis focused more on their miracles than on their inner struggle, character and teachings...

To describe the essence and depth of the Sufi experience in words is almost an impossible task.

We have seen throughout history that Muslims do not react to attacks on God but will never allow any disregard for Prophet Muhammad. They deeply love, trust and venerate their Prophet who forms the exemplary model for each believing Muslim. The central figure in Islam, therefore, forms the axis of the Sufi doctrine.

A knowledge of Sufism requires not just an understanding of Islamic essentials, but a look into the life and role of Muhammad. For mystics, Prophet Muhammad mirrors Allah's attributes.

During my Sufi initiation, I was taught that loving and following the Prophet was to love God. He remains the perfect vehicle to inner enlightment, for even in slumber, he remained connected to Allah...

(Excerpted from the writer's recently released book - Sufism: The Heart of Islam.)
Picture: Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem. Photo: Getty Images.

Piya

By Madhusree Chatterjee, " Open minds to classical arts through school curricula: Shovana Narayan" - IANS/Thai Indian - Bangkok, Thailand
Tuesday, April 28, 2009

New Delhi: Indian dances are not attracting sufficient audiences due to “closed minds” and “non-exposure”, says veteran Kathak exponent Shovana Narayan. The danseuse feels classical arts should be included in school curricula to increase aesthetic appreciation.

“There are several issues in terms of audience attendance. There is a mindset in the ‘none’ or ‘never’ attending viewers that classical dance is beyond understanding. They seem to have a closed mind to it,” Narayan told IANS in an interview here ahead of World Dance Day Wednesday.

She attributes the poor audience turnout to the the “non-exposure to classical dance forms”.
“The ‘unknown’ is to be feared’. However, in my interaction with such audiences, I have found them to be very receptive. Hence, it is the issue of ‘closed mind’ that has to be addressed in an organised way,” she said.

Narayan, who is lobbying for more patronage to classical arts, especially dance, feels that “appreciation of classical arts should be part of the main school curriculum”.

“This process has started, but it needs to be intensified. We don’t need to learn the practicals of classical arts, but theoretically young minds should be made aware of the historical evolution, the beauty and nuances of the various art forms. Through my son Ishan, who was schooling in Austria, I came to realise the importance they attached to art education. Art appreciation as part of his main curriculum,” she said.

Earlier, the danseuse felt, the ability to appreciate arts was addressed at homes.

“But since the homes themselves are now bereft of this sensitivity, educational institutions have to fill the gap. The study of the ‘Natyashastra’ (the ancient treatise on Indian dance) can be included not only in schools but also in some of the specialised study modules such as architecture and biology. ‘Natyashashtra’ is a perfect example of dissecting and studying every movement in a manner similar to what is done in biology,” Narayan said.

At the same time, the dancer felt that the number of children learning classical dance had increased manifold over the years.

“Children devote long periods of time to it, which indicates that they are not doing it under parental pressure. Classical dance, therefore, has not lost its social relevance,” she held.
Narayan also pointed out that classical dances were changing with time to appeal to wider and younger audiences.

“Look at Kathak, it was first documented in the fourth century BC when a Prakrit verse written in the Asokan Brahmi script paid tribute to Kathak’s ’shringara’ in praise of the lord on the banks of the Ganga at Varanasi. It was dedicated to Lord Adinath. Kathak was also mentioned in the ‘adiparva’ of the epic ‘Mahabharata’. It shows the adaptability of the dance form in evolution,” she said.

But with the impact of Sufism, she said ‘tarana’ came to stay.

“Heavy display of rhythmic virtuosity came about during the medieval period as idol-worship was against the tenets of Islam; and along with it, the medium of music and dance as forms of worship. In the field of ‘abhinaya’ (mimetic exposition) where the element of Sufi interpretations was incorporated, ‘Mohan’ (Lord Krishna) became ’sajan’ or ’saiyan’ or ‘piya’ (beloved),” the danseuse explained.

The trend continues, she added. “Mythology is being revisited and portrayed in contemporary terms. Episodes such as the disrobing of Draupadi have been likened to the disrobing of earth of its environmental cover. Similarly, the myth of Kaliya-daman (Lord Krishna slaying the demon-snake Kaliya) is compared to the issue of water pollution. Thus the ability to evolve and adapt to changing times has been the strength of our classical dance,” Narayan said.

On May 3, she will recapture the spirit of Dance Day in a special programme titled “Rhythm & Joy” at the Ashoka Ampitheatre in New Delhi.

Narayan is working on several new projects as well.

“I am choreographing the works of Ali Sardar Jafri, then one on Schubert’s cycle of songs ‘Winter Journey’ in association with Yvonne Timoianu (cello) and another on the universality of emotions of women artistes across the globe. There are other broad rhythmic compositions, which I am still conceptualising,” she said.

[Visit Narayan's website http://www.shovananarayan.com/index.html]

Un-islamic

By Omar Waraich, "Pakistan Pushes Back Against the Taliban" - Time CNN World - USA
Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Rawalpindi: After weeks of watching the Taliban swagger menacingly across Pakistan's northwest as U.S. leaders anxiously demanded action against what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called a "mortal danger," the Pakistani army has moved off the sidelines.

On Tuesday it unleashed a barrage of air and artillery strikes as part of a fresh offensive against the hundreds of Taliban fighters who defied government warnings to leave the Buner Valley, just 70 miles (about 110 km) from Islamabad.

Military officials said the offensive was triggered after the army intercepted Taliban phone conversations that purportedly revealed that last Friday's withdrawal from Buner had been a "symbolic" exercise for the benefit of the cameras and that they planned to linger in Buner before recapturing it.

The Taliban's undimmed ambitions have underscored the perils of the peace agreement the government signed in the militant-controlled Swat Valley, in which it caved in to Taliban demands for the imposition of Islamic law in the area. But although the authorities are now fighting to push the Taliban out of the areas into which they have recently expanded, it's not yet clear whether they have either the ability or the intent to reverse the Taliban's takeover of Swat.

Paramilitary troops from the Frontier Corps, backed by gunships, helicopters and fighter jets, moved against an estimated 450 to 500 Taliban fighters scattered across the Buner Valley. Regular infantry and artillery brigades have been sent to reinforce the effort, and all roads into Buner have been sealed off, with a curfew imposed in nearby areas.

Major General Athar Abbas, the military's chief spokesman, said the aim is to "eliminate or expel" the militants. "We'll start from various positions, and we'll move forward with the help of our firepower and clear the [Buner] valley of the militants," he told reporters at the army's headquarters in the garrison town of Rawalpindi.

The Taliban's capture of Buner last week triggered domestic and global alarm. They had entered the idyllic valley earlier this month, progressively reinforcing their ranks and menacing local residents. Policemen were kidnapped and killed; gas stations and marble factories were seized for potential revenue.

The Taliban barred women from marketplaces and occupied a centuries-old shrine consecrated to a Sufi saint.

As the Taliban established their own checkpoints and the police retreated into their stations, there was little doubt as to who controlled the area.

Pressed by Washington and by public opinion in Pakistan, the government made clear in negotiations with the Taliban that it could not tolerate their extending their authority beyond Swat — and the militants staged their photo-opportunity withdrawal. But as TIME reported earlier this week, scores of fighters remained visible in the valley. "After the government's repeated warnings, only a symbolic withdrawal was made," said General Abbas. The militants simply scaled down their visible presence and removed their checkpoints while continuing to recruit locals to be sent for training in Swat.

Transcripts of the purportedly intercepted conversations between Maulana Fazlullah and Taliban leaders on the ground reveal a plan to hunker down and seize control later. The contents of the tapes cannot be independently verified — and a taped "intercept" provided by authorities following the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was widely derided. But the conversation contains a striking passage in which "Fateh" — a code name believed to be used by Taliban commander Maulvi Khalil, who led the militants into Buner — urges Fazlullah to declare an end to the Swat cease-fire and warns of his men's plans should they come under attack from the security forces.

"This time, we will blast the mines as well," Fateh says. "We will also fire rockets. And we will do something that they'll remember. Tomorrow you will say you didn't know. Tell us now that you've decided so that we end the agreement. From now, we will do the job."

The episode has raised questions about the role of Sufi Muhammad, the ostensibly reformed militant with whom the government brokered the Swat agreement. Muhammad, who led an insurgency in Swat in the 1990s to demand Shari'a law, is the father-in-law of Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah and was imprisoned after returning in 2002 from Afghanistan, where he'd gone to join the fight against the U.S.

The government had hoped he would serve as a bulwark against the Taliban once his Shari'a demand had been met, but now fears are growing that Muhammad may in fact be in league with the militants. Earlier this month, in a public meeting in Swat's main town of Mingora, he openly denounced democracy, parliament and Pakistan's judicial system as "un-Islamic."

The new transcript suggests Muhammad was complicit in a plan to stage what looked like a withdrawal from Buner in order to consolidate the Taliban's position. Also implicated by the military was Syed Muhammad Javed, the commissioner of Malakand division at the time, who has been suspended from his post after being suspected of pro-Taliban sympathies.

As the military began to pound Taliban positions in his home district of Lower Dir on Monday, Sufi Muhammad declared that he was withdrawing from talks with the government. Muhammad's current whereabouts are not known, General Abbas said. As it began to enter Buner, the army was declaring victory in Lower Dir, having killed "70 to 75 militants" in a three-day operation that saw 10 soldiers killed. Amnesty International says the fighting has displaced over 30,000 people from Lower Dir.

The military operation in Buner looks set to stop the Taliban's expansion of control deeper into Pakistan's heartlands. But many observers have expressed a growing impatience with the government and the army's reluctance to recapture the Swat Valley.

The May 2008 peace deal there appears to have given the Taliban the time to regroup and consolidate and to systematically eliminate the army's network of local assets. Deprived of its crucial intelligence-gathering operation, the army often had to resort to artillery fire, alienating the local population as the civilian death toll mounted.

If, indeed, the military is planning to roll back the Taliban's advances of the past year, it will face a long, tough fight ahead. But it's not yet clear just how far back the generals and the political leaders are hoping to push the militants.

Picture: Taliban soldiers stand at the entrance of a shrine dedicated to Pir Baba, a famous saint. The insurgents temporarily closed the building. Photo: Naveed Ali/AP

A Glimpse of the Divine

By Karen Armstrong, "The Hope of Sufism" - The Washington Post On Faith - Washington, DC, USA
Sunday, April 26, 2009

Pakistan's chief problems are political and need a political solution. But political malaise and conflict affects people emotionally, imaginatively, in their relationships, desires and aspirations, and often religion gets sucked into a bad situation and becomes part of the problem.

It is not surprising therefore that some Pakistanis have turned to a somewhat rigid form of Islam. Yet on my visits to the country I have found that people are so open, friendly, eager to hear a friendly voice from the West, and to explore new ways of living an Islamic life.

Sufism is a marvelous form of Islam and would do anybody good anywhere. I came across it very early in my career as a religious historian and was especially drawn to its pluralism.

Sufis have an outstanding tradition of appreciation of other faiths and have therefore an important contribution to make at the present moment in world history when, even though the peoples of the world are drawn more closely together than ever before ( electronically, economically and politically) they are so dangerously polarized.

It is quite common for a Sufi poet to cry aloud in ecstasy that he is neither a Jew, a Christian or a Muslim but is at home in a synagogue, mosque, temple or church because once one has had a glimpse of the divine one has left all these man-made distinctions behind.

I love this quotation from the thirteenth century Sufi philosopher Ibn Arabi:

"Do not praise your own faith exclusively, so that you disbelieve all the rest. If you do this, you will miss much good ~ nay, you will miss the whole truth of the matter.
God the omniscient and omnipresent cannot be confined to any one creed for he says 'Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allah.'
Everybody praises what he knows. His god is his own creature and in praising it, he praises himself, which he would not do if he were just. His dislike is based on ignorance."

The Sufis reflect the profound and inspiring pluralism of the Qur'an and all faiths could do with an infusion of this acknowledgement of our common humanity.