A Very Complicated Frontier

by Sergei Markedonov - special to Russia Profile
Wednesday, May 17, 2006

Caucasus Conflicts More Than a Clash of Civilizations

The North Caucasus is often automatically associated in people’s minds with Islamic extremism and 2005 was, indeed, a year of renewed violence as a form of political activity in the region. The tragic events of the October attack on Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, signalled for many that the Russian state’s main terrorist opponents are no longer secular ethno-nationalists, fighting for an independent Chechnya, but rather Caucasian Islamic terrorists, fighting the international war on terror.

In this sense, the Russian North Caucasus is following a road already taken by countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In these areas, the main proponents of terrorism from the 1960s to the 1980s were secular ethno-nationalists, like Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, who made use of religious values and slogans as just one tool in their struggle. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, proponents of “true Islam,” like the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, began playing an increasingly dominant role. The North Caucasus is now experiencing a similar evolution, as the second half of the 1990s saw ethno-nationalism begin to give way to the slogans of “pure Islam.”

Throughout the region’s history, non-religious considerations have had - and continue to have - a significant influence on the formation of values, norms, institutions and ways of thinking in the region. To begin with, self-identification in the Caucasus is based on the principle of blood - identity as connected to family and kinship groups such as clans. This is both a sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identity. Clans are often divided along geographical lines, with groups that live in the mountains claiming allegiance to each other at the expense of groups who live in the valleys or on the plains. This type of division may also apply to the differences between rural and urban dwellers or nomads and farmers. Additionally, clans may identify with other, larger political or cultural structures that break down along regional lines or particular political beliefs. Clans may determine how open a group of people would be to a modernization project or how tied they are to traditional culture. Family loyalty is stronger than any adherence to aКlarger ethnic or regional grouping, including the nation state.

These divisions all have their roots in history and are not primarily based on religious differences. There have been numerous examples in the history of the Caucasus when ethnic identity or loyalties to different states have caused confrontation between two peoples sharing the same religion. Likewise, there have been cases when religious identity has divided members of the same ethnic group or, on the contrary, united peoples speaking different languages.

Moreover, the idea of a unified and monolithic civilization (Christian or Islamic) based on a common religion is, in many respects, a myth in the context of the Caucasus. Islam in the Caucasus has many faces. There are, for example, the Sufi brotherhoods in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya. Sufism, which is derived from the Arab word “Suf,” for the wool of the rough garments worn by hermits - is a mystical current in Islam that preaches humility and withdrawal from the vain pursuits of the world. The Sufi brotherhoods in the Caucasus are known as tarikat - from the Arab word Tarik, meaning road or path, as in the road to truth. The teacher, or “murshid,” plays a crucial role in Caucasian Sufism. The most influential Tarikats in the Caucasus are Nakhsbandia and Kadiria. Former Chechen separatist president Dzhokhar Dudayev belonged to Kadiria, as did former pro-Moscow Chechen president Akhmat Kadyrov. Doku Zavgayev, another pro-Russian Chechen leader, belonged, instead, to Nakhsbandia.

More dogmatic Islamic theology is also represented in the Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygeya and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, in the form of salifia, or Wahhabism. The Wahhabis oppose the adaptation of Islam to local traditions and denounce the cult of the teacher. One of the greatest political changes in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union is the divide that has split Muslims into followers of traditional local Islam and supporters of the Wahhabi doctrines. Both sides have proven capable of extremist views.

The periodic flare-ups in the latent interethnic conflicts in the Caucasus have involved participants of many different ethnic groups, all sharing the Islamic faith. The Kabardis and Balkars in conflict in Kabardino-Balkaria are both Muslim peoples, as are the rival Karachais and Cherkesses, the Avars and the Chechen-Akkins, the Laks and the Kumyks. Splits between the followers of different sects in Islam have developed into sometimes ruthless and violent conflicts, with the most serious in Dagestan and Chechnya.

As for Christian representatives and groupings in the Caucasus, the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church’s 98 dioceses in the region are much more prepared to engage in dialogue with representatives of traditional local Islam than with Catholic or Protestant preachers. The most consistent follower of this line is Metropolitan Feofan (Ashurkov) of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz. This speaks of a supra-religious identity shared by the traditional faiths and based on perceptions of the historical roots of a faith in the region. In this sense, “old Islam” and the Orthodox Church stand opposed to Wahhabism and Protestant groups such as the Seventh-Day Adventists, Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as groups like the Hare Krishnas.

Appeals to ethnic, religious or cultural identity have always been a response to situations determined by specific historical circumstances. The peoples of the Caucasus might see themselves as representatives of religious “civilizations” (Christian, Muslim, and Buddhist) and, at the same time, as defenders of ethnic interests, citizens of a particular state, participants in modernization or defenders of traditional values. Concepts of ethnic, religious, state and social identity in the Caucasus have always been in flux.

The Caucasus has always been a region of shifting borders and identities. A listing of the various state and administrative-territorial transformations in the region through history would fill a book. The region has never ceased to be a shifting frontier area - not even during the years of Soviet hegemony. In this respect, the ethno-political and religious processes in the Caucasus cannot be reduced to the clash of civilizations scheme involving a conflict between religions. Historically, the Caucasus has been a contact zone for different ethnic, religious, ethno-religious and ethno-social groups, and the interaction between all of these different groups over various historical periods has created the unique mosaic we see today.