The Common Ground

By Mazen Hashem - Alt Muslim - USA Monday, January 21, 2008

Common sense says that Shii scholars make clear their rejection of the offshoot ideas ascribed to them and that Sunni scholars should not get hooked on historical debates

The popular explanation of the Sunni-Shii friction is that it is a matter of sectarian religious difference.

In reality, there are three fault lines trigger friction between Sunnis and Shiis: the fiqhi line, the mental image of history, and folkways.

Gripped by group identity conflict, Sunni and Shii forget the ample common ground between them at the level of values and ultimate socioeconomic aims.

To the average Muslim, fiqh stands for Islam itself as it represents an easy-to-understand template of the good conduct. Most people become troubled by minor fiqhi disagreements because they are not fully aware of the extent to which there are acceptable fiqhi variations within the corpus of ulama’s work.

When it comes to the Sunni-Shii divide, the average person would interpret such fiqhi variation as a deviation from Sharia itself. Interestingly, the fiqhi gap among some of the major Sunni schools is larger than the gap between the Jaafari Shii school on one hand and some Sunni schools on the other.

Few may know that Jaafar al-Sadiq (the principal figure of the Jaafari school) was the teacher of Abu Hanifa, the famous Sunni scholar. He was also the son of Abu Bakr’s granddaughter.

(...)

Despite the fact that Sunnis and Shiis share the same Muslim history, they have radically different constructions of such a history. The root of such disagreement does not lie simply in the differing interpretations of historical events but in the focus on different aspects of it.

While the Sunni perspective is aware of the deviations that occurred in realm of politics, they focus their attention on the civilizational achievements of Muslims. Shiis, on the other hand, focus on the problem of a “stolen” leadership from those who deserve it.

Such position from the Shiis enrages Sunnis as it trumps marvelous Muslim civilizational achievements, acknowledged by Muslim as well as non-Muslim scholars. Shiis avoid talking about civilizational achievements and insist on focusing on the downside aspects: political domination and repressing Shii radical groups.

For Sunnis, the claims of historical repression that are popular in Shii stories resemble urban legends that cannot stand the scrutiny of historical-scientific research. Furthermore, when Shiis gained political control in Muslim history, they were not less royal than the Sunni rulers that Shiis disparage.

In the Savadi era (1501-1722), Shiism constructed many of its customs and popular myths as an ideology to buttress political control. However, in doing so, the Shii Savadis were not very different from the Sunni Ottomans who were mustering their political control through sponsoring Sufism.

It is much more defensible to relate the contemporary Shii revival to the Qajari period (1799-1925) rather to the Savadis. The Qajari period was marked by political instability, which prompted Shii clerics to overcome their dominant norm of quietism and to get engaged in politics.

In contrast, the Sunni ulama of this period had a state that spoke on their behalf and did not feel the need to be as politically engaged.

Ironically, the contemporary political fragmentation in today’s Muslim countries resemble a Sunni Qajari period where Sunni clerics are showing more interest in, and willingness to engage in, politics.

Muslims have lived their history in highly pluralistic settings. Therefore, different groupings of people maintained their local cultural practices, which intermixed with Islamic elements. For the average person, the folkways that are imbued with an Islamic spirit replace the root ideas of religion itself.

For example, both the Sunni and the Shii go to the mosque and get a spiritual lift through listening to preaching and stories, but such preaching is of different genres and invokes the memories of different personalities.

Shiis feel that Sunnis do not give due respect to ahl al-bayt, the progeny of Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis on the other hand are troubled by the thick rituals of Shiism that have the cult of saint’s properties.

Sunnis have their myths too, but mainly housed in Sufism which, despite its widespread, does not represent the mainstream.

The above mentioned differences stay mute in peaceful times. However, in times of extreme uncertainty and political agitation, they intensify the conflict. Furthermore, when political violence targets venerated symbols, revenge becomes sadistic, justified on the basis of denigrating the sacred.

(...)

It does not take a learned person to recognize the both Sunnis and Shiis share an Islamic outlook based on the values of Islam and its social orientation. The very logic of Islam is rooted in the idea of unity of the creator and the centrality of the transcendental guidance in refining human conduct.

Sunni as well as Shii lines consider that the righteous deeds of taqwa are the basis of individuals’ worth, upon which they will be responsible at the Day of Judgment. Furthermore, both lines assert collective responsibility in seeking truth at the cultural level and fighting taghoot (oppression) at the sociopolitical level.

Sunni and Shii traditions revere personal purity, the family institution, and the role of motherhood.
Furthermore, they converge on the centrality of the concepts of justice, mercy, and moderation, considering them as the cornerstone of the moral social order.

The Sunni-Shii historical political disagreement was, at its roots, a disagreement on the political arrangement that would preserve the values of Islam. Muslims today have the option of recognizing the common ground on which their different factions draw or to plunge into sectarian rivalry.

Mazen Hashem holds a doctoral degree in sociology. His research focuses on the Muslim communities in North America.