By Dr. Nouri Talabany and Howar Talabany* - Kurdish Aspect - Denver, CO, USA
Friday, January 19, 2008
An apercu general of Kurdish nationalism till the end of the First War World
The end of World War I was the signal for the effective beginning of the great upsurge of nationalism, which reached its fruition after 1945.
While Turkish and Arabic nationalisms were gaining a stronghold amongst the people, and establishing independent nation-states to determine their destiny, another minority within the Ottoman Empire was gradually and passionately emerging the awakening of the Kurds.
Kurdish nationalism faced many obstacles; the Kurds were initially distributed between the Ottoman and Qajar empires, later divided between the newly established nation-states of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
The period of Kurdish nationalism provided a number of key figures who shaped the nation's history; Sheikh Ubayd Allah Nehri (1880) and later Sheikh Said Piran (1925) who were prominent religious leaders who led nationalist rebellions; Sheikh Mahmud Hafid, another religious figure established an autonomous region in the 1920s in southern Kurdistan; and finally the short-lived Republic of Mahabad which was established by Qazi Muhammad in 1946.
Background to Kurdish Religion
Religion plays a predominate role in Kurdish society. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but there are a number of minorities, some rooting from Islam such as the Alevis and Ahl i Haqq, while others include Christians, Jews and the pagan Yezidis that stem from Zoroastrism.
It is believed that the majority of 'ancient' Kurds followed the Yezidi faith. However at the time of nationalist revival Sunni Islam had established itself amongst nearly two thirds of the population.
The Kurdish concept of Islam derives from Sufism and many are affiliated with a tariqat led by sheikhs who are the spiritual guides of their disciples. By the nineteenth century the fall of the secularized Kurdish emirates of Baban and Badr Khan ensured that religious sheikhs remained the only source of power in the Kurdistan.
Kurdish society was dominated by religious leaders, particularly the Qadiri and Naqashbandi orders, which only grew stronger with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. These orders have played an important social and political role in Kurdistan as they represent a pattern of social organisation independent of the tribes as well as the state.
It is no coincidence that the early Kurdish nationalist uprisings were led by sheikhs, and as were the only leaders capable of mobilizing a significant section of the population.
No national movement and no persisting ethnic identity can emerge without bedrock of shared meanings and ideals, which guide action and determine the direction of social change.
The national consciousness of the Kurdish people is no exception, and has developed its claim through a history rich with myths glorifying heroes and struggles that have come to result in the ethnic group now defined as 'Kurds'.
Many claim that their ethnic distinctiveness has been apparent for thousands of years, although the most renowned work, the Sharafnama by Sharaf Khan Biltisi, was written in 1597. The Sharafnama illustrates that the Kurds have identified their distinct differentiation from their neighbors, Persians, Arabs and Turks, despite being integrated in their empires.
(...)
End of the Ottoman Empire
The partition of the Ottoman Empire had vast consequences for the spread of nationalism amongst all the ethnic minorities, most particularly the Kurds.
This is apparent in the various revolts that took place in Turkey and former Mesopotamia, particularly after the Treaty of Sèvres collapsed and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, destroyed all Kurdish aspirations for a unified, independent Kurdistan.
However, such a devastating blow to Kurdish nationalism only encouraged these ideas to spread amongst the people, creating more vibrant and determined movements to emerge.
Theorists on nationalism believe that if a national identity has survived into the new century, it cannot be pressured into relinquishing its desire for national autonomy.
This was indeed the case for the Kurds; however the partition of the empire resulted in Kurdistan being separated amongst four states, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, thus making a pan-Kurdish movement much more difficult to mobilize as it created inconstant political space.
Such a divisive factor, combined with increasing tribal and religious tensions, produced different national movements under uncoordinated leadership.
(...)
It was under the climax of exclusionary Turkish nationalism that a new secretive nationalist organisation was established in 1923 under the name of Azadi (Freedom).
This political organisation differentiated from the ones in Istanbul during the Young Turks, as it was not solely confined to urban notables but openly aimed to attract Kurdish religious leaders. Azadi was very much a nationalist movement and had the advantage of military men as the nucleus of its organisation.
However despite their nationalist fervour Azadi members were well aware that they did not as yet have the support of the Kurdish masses, and lacked the power and appeal necessary to enlist mass support.
They tactfully sought the religious sheikhs as the figurehead of the movement in order to gain mass support from the religiously minded people. These included Yusuf Zia Beg, Khalid Beg Jibran and Sheikh Said of Piran, a sheikh with great local influence.
Azadi made a considerable impact to the spread of Kurdish nationalism and actively supported tribal rebellions in Turkey. Such enthusiasm by the armed tribesmen enhanced the buoyancy of Azadi, despite the efforts of the Turkish state to suppress their activity.
With the abolition of the caliphate, Azadi under the leadership of Sheikh Said revolted in a large area of Turkish Kurdistan in February 1925.
The Sheikh Said rebellion was a hybrid of nationalist aspirations and a desire to restore religion, with the hope of creating an independent Kurdistan. There is a little evidence inciting the establishment of a theocratic state, although the leadership of the rebellion was headed primarily by religious sheikhs.
The Turkish authorities reacted to the rebellion in a brutal manner via a massive troop operation, which soon brought the revolt to an end with the hanging of Sheikh Said and the other prominent leaders. Despite this, the rebellion proved that Kurdish nationalism was now a strong mobilizing force although it technically remained a tribal affair.
Sheikh Said had disregarded the role of non-tribal peasants, as they were controlled by landowners unwilling to risk their position with the Turkish state. Moreover, the majority of the tribesmen viewed the peasants' combat skills as worthless: 'tribesmen are warriors and do not toil, non-tribal is thought unfit to fight'.
The rebellion also lacked open support from the Kurdish notables who did not want to 'jeopardize their position with tribal forces led by sheikhs [sic] or the unproven strengths of Kurdish nationalism'.
Nonetheless, it seems that support from other tribes, particularly the Alvais, would have been a far more beneficial factor in terms of warfare, rather than the support of the peasants and notables, as it was the tribesmen who traditionally knew how to fight battles.
While the Sheikh Said rebellion can be identified as the first large-scale nationalist rebellion, it effectively used religion to mobilize and spread nationalist propaganda. At a time when the only viable leadership came from sheikhs, religion could not be separated from nationalist movements.
The people only identified with local authority, and nationalism as a movement was not effective motivation to charge a rebellion: on the other hand, religion which was central and stimulated by primordial loyalties to the sheikhs, proved far more powerful.
However the primary aim of both Sheikh Said and the Azadi leaders was the establishment of an independent Kurdistan rather than the spread of a pan-Islamic movement. After the Sheikhs had given their approval, nationalist loyalties began to lead a life of their own without religious association. If the sheikhs had frowned on such a movement, it is doubtful whether the Azadi leaders would have had such an impact of the spread of Kurdish nationalism.
*Nouri Talabany, Professor of Law, Member of the Kurdish Academy, MKP ( Kurdistan Parliament).
Miss Howar Nouri Talabany, MB Political Sciences, University of London.
'Acque & Terre' Magazine, No 6, December, 2007, Italy.
Saturday, January 19, 2008
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Saturday, January 19, 2008
On Kurdish Nationalism
Friday, January 19, 2008
An apercu general of Kurdish nationalism till the end of the First War World
The end of World War I was the signal for the effective beginning of the great upsurge of nationalism, which reached its fruition after 1945.
While Turkish and Arabic nationalisms were gaining a stronghold amongst the people, and establishing independent nation-states to determine their destiny, another minority within the Ottoman Empire was gradually and passionately emerging the awakening of the Kurds.
Kurdish nationalism faced many obstacles; the Kurds were initially distributed between the Ottoman and Qajar empires, later divided between the newly established nation-states of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
The period of Kurdish nationalism provided a number of key figures who shaped the nation's history; Sheikh Ubayd Allah Nehri (1880) and later Sheikh Said Piran (1925) who were prominent religious leaders who led nationalist rebellions; Sheikh Mahmud Hafid, another religious figure established an autonomous region in the 1920s in southern Kurdistan; and finally the short-lived Republic of Mahabad which was established by Qazi Muhammad in 1946.
Background to Kurdish Religion
Religion plays a predominate role in Kurdish society. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but there are a number of minorities, some rooting from Islam such as the Alevis and Ahl i Haqq, while others include Christians, Jews and the pagan Yezidis that stem from Zoroastrism.
It is believed that the majority of 'ancient' Kurds followed the Yezidi faith. However at the time of nationalist revival Sunni Islam had established itself amongst nearly two thirds of the population.
The Kurdish concept of Islam derives from Sufism and many are affiliated with a tariqat led by sheikhs who are the spiritual guides of their disciples. By the nineteenth century the fall of the secularized Kurdish emirates of Baban and Badr Khan ensured that religious sheikhs remained the only source of power in the Kurdistan.
Kurdish society was dominated by religious leaders, particularly the Qadiri and Naqashbandi orders, which only grew stronger with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. These orders have played an important social and political role in Kurdistan as they represent a pattern of social organisation independent of the tribes as well as the state.
It is no coincidence that the early Kurdish nationalist uprisings were led by sheikhs, and as were the only leaders capable of mobilizing a significant section of the population.
No national movement and no persisting ethnic identity can emerge without bedrock of shared meanings and ideals, which guide action and determine the direction of social change.
The national consciousness of the Kurdish people is no exception, and has developed its claim through a history rich with myths glorifying heroes and struggles that have come to result in the ethnic group now defined as 'Kurds'.
Many claim that their ethnic distinctiveness has been apparent for thousands of years, although the most renowned work, the Sharafnama by Sharaf Khan Biltisi, was written in 1597. The Sharafnama illustrates that the Kurds have identified their distinct differentiation from their neighbors, Persians, Arabs and Turks, despite being integrated in their empires.
(...)
End of the Ottoman Empire
The partition of the Ottoman Empire had vast consequences for the spread of nationalism amongst all the ethnic minorities, most particularly the Kurds.
This is apparent in the various revolts that took place in Turkey and former Mesopotamia, particularly after the Treaty of Sèvres collapsed and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, destroyed all Kurdish aspirations for a unified, independent Kurdistan.
However, such a devastating blow to Kurdish nationalism only encouraged these ideas to spread amongst the people, creating more vibrant and determined movements to emerge.
Theorists on nationalism believe that if a national identity has survived into the new century, it cannot be pressured into relinquishing its desire for national autonomy.
This was indeed the case for the Kurds; however the partition of the empire resulted in Kurdistan being separated amongst four states, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, thus making a pan-Kurdish movement much more difficult to mobilize as it created inconstant political space.
Such a divisive factor, combined with increasing tribal and religious tensions, produced different national movements under uncoordinated leadership.
(...)
It was under the climax of exclusionary Turkish nationalism that a new secretive nationalist organisation was established in 1923 under the name of Azadi (Freedom).
This political organisation differentiated from the ones in Istanbul during the Young Turks, as it was not solely confined to urban notables but openly aimed to attract Kurdish religious leaders. Azadi was very much a nationalist movement and had the advantage of military men as the nucleus of its organisation.
However despite their nationalist fervour Azadi members were well aware that they did not as yet have the support of the Kurdish masses, and lacked the power and appeal necessary to enlist mass support.
They tactfully sought the religious sheikhs as the figurehead of the movement in order to gain mass support from the religiously minded people. These included Yusuf Zia Beg, Khalid Beg Jibran and Sheikh Said of Piran, a sheikh with great local influence.
Azadi made a considerable impact to the spread of Kurdish nationalism and actively supported tribal rebellions in Turkey. Such enthusiasm by the armed tribesmen enhanced the buoyancy of Azadi, despite the efforts of the Turkish state to suppress their activity.
With the abolition of the caliphate, Azadi under the leadership of Sheikh Said revolted in a large area of Turkish Kurdistan in February 1925.
The Sheikh Said rebellion was a hybrid of nationalist aspirations and a desire to restore religion, with the hope of creating an independent Kurdistan. There is a little evidence inciting the establishment of a theocratic state, although the leadership of the rebellion was headed primarily by religious sheikhs.
The Turkish authorities reacted to the rebellion in a brutal manner via a massive troop operation, which soon brought the revolt to an end with the hanging of Sheikh Said and the other prominent leaders. Despite this, the rebellion proved that Kurdish nationalism was now a strong mobilizing force although it technically remained a tribal affair.
Sheikh Said had disregarded the role of non-tribal peasants, as they were controlled by landowners unwilling to risk their position with the Turkish state. Moreover, the majority of the tribesmen viewed the peasants' combat skills as worthless: 'tribesmen are warriors and do not toil, non-tribal is thought unfit to fight'.
The rebellion also lacked open support from the Kurdish notables who did not want to 'jeopardize their position with tribal forces led by sheikhs [sic] or the unproven strengths of Kurdish nationalism'.
Nonetheless, it seems that support from other tribes, particularly the Alvais, would have been a far more beneficial factor in terms of warfare, rather than the support of the peasants and notables, as it was the tribesmen who traditionally knew how to fight battles.
While the Sheikh Said rebellion can be identified as the first large-scale nationalist rebellion, it effectively used religion to mobilize and spread nationalist propaganda. At a time when the only viable leadership came from sheikhs, religion could not be separated from nationalist movements.
The people only identified with local authority, and nationalism as a movement was not effective motivation to charge a rebellion: on the other hand, religion which was central and stimulated by primordial loyalties to the sheikhs, proved far more powerful.
However the primary aim of both Sheikh Said and the Azadi leaders was the establishment of an independent Kurdistan rather than the spread of a pan-Islamic movement. After the Sheikhs had given their approval, nationalist loyalties began to lead a life of their own without religious association. If the sheikhs had frowned on such a movement, it is doubtful whether the Azadi leaders would have had such an impact of the spread of Kurdish nationalism.
*Nouri Talabany, Professor of Law, Member of the Kurdish Academy, MKP ( Kurdistan Parliament).
Miss Howar Nouri Talabany, MB Political Sciences, University of London.
'Acque & Terre' Magazine, No 6, December, 2007, Italy.
Labels:
politics
By Dr. Nouri Talabany and Howar Talabany* - Kurdish Aspect - Denver, CO, USAFriday, January 19, 2008
An apercu general of Kurdish nationalism till the end of the First War World
The end of World War I was the signal for the effective beginning of the great upsurge of nationalism, which reached its fruition after 1945.
While Turkish and Arabic nationalisms were gaining a stronghold amongst the people, and establishing independent nation-states to determine their destiny, another minority within the Ottoman Empire was gradually and passionately emerging the awakening of the Kurds.
Kurdish nationalism faced many obstacles; the Kurds were initially distributed between the Ottoman and Qajar empires, later divided between the newly established nation-states of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
The period of Kurdish nationalism provided a number of key figures who shaped the nation's history; Sheikh Ubayd Allah Nehri (1880) and later Sheikh Said Piran (1925) who were prominent religious leaders who led nationalist rebellions; Sheikh Mahmud Hafid, another religious figure established an autonomous region in the 1920s in southern Kurdistan; and finally the short-lived Republic of Mahabad which was established by Qazi Muhammad in 1946.
Background to Kurdish Religion
Religion plays a predominate role in Kurdish society. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but there are a number of minorities, some rooting from Islam such as the Alevis and Ahl i Haqq, while others include Christians, Jews and the pagan Yezidis that stem from Zoroastrism.
It is believed that the majority of 'ancient' Kurds followed the Yezidi faith. However at the time of nationalist revival Sunni Islam had established itself amongst nearly two thirds of the population.
The Kurdish concept of Islam derives from Sufism and many are affiliated with a tariqat led by sheikhs who are the spiritual guides of their disciples. By the nineteenth century the fall of the secularized Kurdish emirates of Baban and Badr Khan ensured that religious sheikhs remained the only source of power in the Kurdistan.
Kurdish society was dominated by religious leaders, particularly the Qadiri and Naqashbandi orders, which only grew stronger with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. These orders have played an important social and political role in Kurdistan as they represent a pattern of social organisation independent of the tribes as well as the state.
It is no coincidence that the early Kurdish nationalist uprisings were led by sheikhs, and as were the only leaders capable of mobilizing a significant section of the population.
No national movement and no persisting ethnic identity can emerge without bedrock of shared meanings and ideals, which guide action and determine the direction of social change.
The national consciousness of the Kurdish people is no exception, and has developed its claim through a history rich with myths glorifying heroes and struggles that have come to result in the ethnic group now defined as 'Kurds'.
Many claim that their ethnic distinctiveness has been apparent for thousands of years, although the most renowned work, the Sharafnama by Sharaf Khan Biltisi, was written in 1597. The Sharafnama illustrates that the Kurds have identified their distinct differentiation from their neighbors, Persians, Arabs and Turks, despite being integrated in their empires.
(...)
End of the Ottoman Empire
The partition of the Ottoman Empire had vast consequences for the spread of nationalism amongst all the ethnic minorities, most particularly the Kurds.
This is apparent in the various revolts that took place in Turkey and former Mesopotamia, particularly after the Treaty of Sèvres collapsed and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, destroyed all Kurdish aspirations for a unified, independent Kurdistan.
However, such a devastating blow to Kurdish nationalism only encouraged these ideas to spread amongst the people, creating more vibrant and determined movements to emerge.
Theorists on nationalism believe that if a national identity has survived into the new century, it cannot be pressured into relinquishing its desire for national autonomy.
This was indeed the case for the Kurds; however the partition of the empire resulted in Kurdistan being separated amongst four states, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, thus making a pan-Kurdish movement much more difficult to mobilize as it created inconstant political space.
Such a divisive factor, combined with increasing tribal and religious tensions, produced different national movements under uncoordinated leadership.
(...)
It was under the climax of exclusionary Turkish nationalism that a new secretive nationalist organisation was established in 1923 under the name of Azadi (Freedom).
This political organisation differentiated from the ones in Istanbul during the Young Turks, as it was not solely confined to urban notables but openly aimed to attract Kurdish religious leaders. Azadi was very much a nationalist movement and had the advantage of military men as the nucleus of its organisation.
However despite their nationalist fervour Azadi members were well aware that they did not as yet have the support of the Kurdish masses, and lacked the power and appeal necessary to enlist mass support.
They tactfully sought the religious sheikhs as the figurehead of the movement in order to gain mass support from the religiously minded people. These included Yusuf Zia Beg, Khalid Beg Jibran and Sheikh Said of Piran, a sheikh with great local influence.
Azadi made a considerable impact to the spread of Kurdish nationalism and actively supported tribal rebellions in Turkey. Such enthusiasm by the armed tribesmen enhanced the buoyancy of Azadi, despite the efforts of the Turkish state to suppress their activity.
With the abolition of the caliphate, Azadi under the leadership of Sheikh Said revolted in a large area of Turkish Kurdistan in February 1925.
The Sheikh Said rebellion was a hybrid of nationalist aspirations and a desire to restore religion, with the hope of creating an independent Kurdistan. There is a little evidence inciting the establishment of a theocratic state, although the leadership of the rebellion was headed primarily by religious sheikhs.
The Turkish authorities reacted to the rebellion in a brutal manner via a massive troop operation, which soon brought the revolt to an end with the hanging of Sheikh Said and the other prominent leaders. Despite this, the rebellion proved that Kurdish nationalism was now a strong mobilizing force although it technically remained a tribal affair.
Sheikh Said had disregarded the role of non-tribal peasants, as they were controlled by landowners unwilling to risk their position with the Turkish state. Moreover, the majority of the tribesmen viewed the peasants' combat skills as worthless: 'tribesmen are warriors and do not toil, non-tribal is thought unfit to fight'.
The rebellion also lacked open support from the Kurdish notables who did not want to 'jeopardize their position with tribal forces led by sheikhs [sic] or the unproven strengths of Kurdish nationalism'.
Nonetheless, it seems that support from other tribes, particularly the Alvais, would have been a far more beneficial factor in terms of warfare, rather than the support of the peasants and notables, as it was the tribesmen who traditionally knew how to fight battles.
While the Sheikh Said rebellion can be identified as the first large-scale nationalist rebellion, it effectively used religion to mobilize and spread nationalist propaganda. At a time when the only viable leadership came from sheikhs, religion could not be separated from nationalist movements.
The people only identified with local authority, and nationalism as a movement was not effective motivation to charge a rebellion: on the other hand, religion which was central and stimulated by primordial loyalties to the sheikhs, proved far more powerful.
However the primary aim of both Sheikh Said and the Azadi leaders was the establishment of an independent Kurdistan rather than the spread of a pan-Islamic movement. After the Sheikhs had given their approval, nationalist loyalties began to lead a life of their own without religious association. If the sheikhs had frowned on such a movement, it is doubtful whether the Azadi leaders would have had such an impact of the spread of Kurdish nationalism.
*Nouri Talabany, Professor of Law, Member of the Kurdish Academy, MKP ( Kurdistan Parliament).
Miss Howar Nouri Talabany, MB Political Sciences, University of London.
'Acque & Terre' Magazine, No 6, December, 2007, Italy.
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