By Mustafa El-Labbad, *Understanding Iran's elections* - Al-Ahram Weekly - Cairo, EgyptIssue n° 952, 18-24 June 2009
One needs to understand the broader, "strategic" mind that guides Iran before grasping the significance of lower contests for the presidency
The 10th presidential polls in Iran drew to a close with the victory of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in the first round. The surprising results triggered a storm in Iran that has yet to subside. As mass protests rage in Iran's major cities on the part of supporters of reformist candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi, observers are wondering how to reasonably contextualise these developments.
To even begin answering such a complex question we must look beyond customary platitudes. Some Ahmadinejad fans maintain that he was the "candidate of the poor", the leader of the "rejectionist axis" in the region, and "the chief enemy of the US and Israel," and that these are the factors that decided the election in his favour.
However, such labels that play on the prevalent themes of his ideological rhetoric fail to supply a sufficiently objective analytical framework. Nor does the customary left-versus-right framework serve the purpose, given that all candidates were solid members and supporters of the establishment and that their ideological stances elude such ready-to-hand pegs; that the entire socio-political map in Iran is much more fluid.
Nevertheless, the Ahmadinejad- Mousavi contest and the electoral results did throw into relief some major regional, ethnic, gender and other socio-cultural divides. In addition, while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly enjoyed broad support among large segments of Iranian society, he also had the backing of certain state agencies and their military and security arms, which intervened on his behalf and against Mousavi who also indisputably enjoyed widespread popularity. This intervention, moreover, was not necessarily ideologically motivated, as will be explained.
There is also a danger in projecting the superficial "good-versus-evil" dichotomy onto the "conservative- versus-reformist" dichotomy and fitting this into a hackneyed mould. It produces nothing but cheap name- calling and mudslinging: if Ahmadinejad is as described above then, according to the labellers, Mousavi must be the "candidate of the rich", "the friend of Israel", and the "enemy of the resistance".
Nothing puts paid to such mindless branding more than the fact that Mousavi, like Ahmadinejad, is a card-carrying member of the regime. Thus, to praise the incumbent as a champion of the rejectionists and to condemn his electoral rival as some kind of turncoat ignores the real dynamics between the wings of the Iranian regime.
Iran entered its electoral season at the height of its "soft strength," having fiercely resisted all forms of international pressure and, in recent years, succeeding in extending its regional influence as never before. Four candidates fielded themselves for the presidency, a very rare sight in the Middle East, even if the Iranian presidency is not the top office in the land under their constitution. The regime emerged from the elections deeply shaken by the biggest challenge to its legitimacy in the history of the Islamic Republic. However, like the good-versus-evil dichotomy, it is facile to pass off the post-election furore as a "conspiracy".
The reform candidate Mousavi, who had served as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war and who had safeguarded the Iranian economy and steered his country's foreign policy during that period, is not an "American plot" against Iran. To think otherwise not only does an injustice to Mousavi but to the entire Iranian regime. And the tens of thousands who have taken to the street in protest against the official results of the polls and in support of Mousavi are not "enemies of Iran" or "agents of foreign powers". Their sheer numbers alone indicate that they express a large and significant body of popular sentiment.
But Mousavi is not a devil, nor is he an angel and the same applies to Ahmadinejad. The two are political rivals who competed in the electoral process, campaigning on the basis of their respective beliefs regarding what best serves Iran's national interests. Herein resides a major lesson in real life.
Sufism not only plays a major role in Iranian culture -- its influence extends to its political heritage. Indeed, we could say that present-day Iran is very much an extension of the great legacy of such Sufi philosophers and poets as Khayyam, Hafez, Bastami and Rumi. The political and cultural substance in Iran has naturally been imbued by the contributions of these intellectual and literary giants, some of whom explored causal relations that extend beyond the immediately discernible.
In his major poem Mathnawi wa Ma'nawi (Spiritual Couplets), Rumi relates the story of two ants walking by a splendid painting of colourful flowers. The first ant tells the second, "My, what a beautiful painting this is! It all has to do with the colours." The second responds, "No, the beauty stems from the fingers that controlled how the colours were applied." To which the first answers, "But the fingers are nothing without the influence of the wrist. The wrist is the most important!" Naturally, the wrist leads to the forearm, the forearm to the upper arm, and finally the arm to the mind, which, as the second ant says, "moves the upper arm, the forearm, the wrist, and the fingers." The first ant pauses at this and then says, "But the mind, unless transformed by God, is mere matter."
The story, of course, is a parable about epistemology. Rumi has a perception of a "partial mind" and a "total mind", the former belonging to human beings and, hence, subject to limitations of time and place, as much as it strives towards comprehending the greater truth, which can only perceived by the "total" or all-seeing mind. If we may apply Rumi's famous spiritual-metaphysical concept to present-day Iranian politics, we might say that there exists an Iranian strategic mind above the parts, these being the candidates and the tactical approaches and partial ideas they advocate. The strategic or "whole" mind draws the greater picture and the candidates move within its contours to the extent their manoeuvrability and skills permit.
One cannot escape the observation that each of the presidents of the Iranian Republic from Rafsanjani through Khatami to Ahmadinejad had certain traits that suited Iran's national interests at the time. Rafsanjani served as president in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and oversaw the reconstruction of the country at a crucial and precarious moment. Because of his influence among all the articulations of the regime, and his "historic legitimacy" during the Islamic revolution, his presence at the helm alleviated internal contradictions and helped smooth Tehran's emergence from its international isolation.
Khatami was the intellectual and enlightened president who rehabilitated Iran's "soft power" through his appeals to a "dialogue of civilisation" and "faith and philosophy" which, incidentally, demonstrated the Iranian talent in transposing its rich Sufi metaphysical heritage into contemporary moulds.
In the era of the smiling, open-minded Khatami, Iran made impressive and irreversible leaps forward in its nuclear programme. In Ahmadinejad's first term, Khatami's foremost achievement -- the inroad into nuclear technology -- became the mainspring for Iran's regional project. Aided by former US president Bush's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, Iran under Ahmadinejad succeeded in expanding its regional influence as never before. By the end of his term, Obama was elected president in the US and had begun to make overtures to Iran that would have been inconceivable under Bush.
Iran is not facing a problem in Iraq; Obama is, having inherited it from his predecessor. Tehran is not the party that has to reassure its allies that it will be entering into dialogue with Washington; the reverse is the case. Now that the tone of US-Iranian relations has shifted from sabre-rattling to conciliation, the Iranian strategic mind seems to have rejected the Obama framework for talks and that same mind seems to think that another Ahmadinejad term will best serve to secure concessions or further softening from Washington.
Apparently, too, that mind feels that the current regional situation presents an opportunity for the further expansion of Iranian influence before finally sitting down for talks with Washington and that Ahmadinejad's hardline approach is best suited for the purpose of gaining a stronger hand.
The results of the Iranian elections can only be understood by trying to grasp the greater picture as perceived by the strategic mind behind the scene, all other innumerable details being precisely that: details.
One needs to understand the broader, "strategic" mind that guides Iran before grasping the significance of lower contests for the presidency
The 10th presidential polls in Iran drew to a close with the victory of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in the first round. The surprising results triggered a storm in Iran that has yet to subside. As mass protests rage in Iran's major cities on the part of supporters of reformist candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi, observers are wondering how to reasonably contextualise these developments.
To even begin answering such a complex question we must look beyond customary platitudes. Some Ahmadinejad fans maintain that he was the "candidate of the poor", the leader of the "rejectionist axis" in the region, and "the chief enemy of the US and Israel," and that these are the factors that decided the election in his favour.
However, such labels that play on the prevalent themes of his ideological rhetoric fail to supply a sufficiently objective analytical framework. Nor does the customary left-versus-right framework serve the purpose, given that all candidates were solid members and supporters of the establishment and that their ideological stances elude such ready-to-hand pegs; that the entire socio-political map in Iran is much more fluid.
Nevertheless, the Ahmadinejad- Mousavi contest and the electoral results did throw into relief some major regional, ethnic, gender and other socio-cultural divides. In addition, while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly enjoyed broad support among large segments of Iranian society, he also had the backing of certain state agencies and their military and security arms, which intervened on his behalf and against Mousavi who also indisputably enjoyed widespread popularity. This intervention, moreover, was not necessarily ideologically motivated, as will be explained.
There is also a danger in projecting the superficial "good-versus-evil" dichotomy onto the "conservative- versus-reformist" dichotomy and fitting this into a hackneyed mould. It produces nothing but cheap name- calling and mudslinging: if Ahmadinejad is as described above then, according to the labellers, Mousavi must be the "candidate of the rich", "the friend of Israel", and the "enemy of the resistance".
Nothing puts paid to such mindless branding more than the fact that Mousavi, like Ahmadinejad, is a card-carrying member of the regime. Thus, to praise the incumbent as a champion of the rejectionists and to condemn his electoral rival as some kind of turncoat ignores the real dynamics between the wings of the Iranian regime.
Iran entered its electoral season at the height of its "soft strength," having fiercely resisted all forms of international pressure and, in recent years, succeeding in extending its regional influence as never before. Four candidates fielded themselves for the presidency, a very rare sight in the Middle East, even if the Iranian presidency is not the top office in the land under their constitution. The regime emerged from the elections deeply shaken by the biggest challenge to its legitimacy in the history of the Islamic Republic. However, like the good-versus-evil dichotomy, it is facile to pass off the post-election furore as a "conspiracy".
The reform candidate Mousavi, who had served as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war and who had safeguarded the Iranian economy and steered his country's foreign policy during that period, is not an "American plot" against Iran. To think otherwise not only does an injustice to Mousavi but to the entire Iranian regime. And the tens of thousands who have taken to the street in protest against the official results of the polls and in support of Mousavi are not "enemies of Iran" or "agents of foreign powers". Their sheer numbers alone indicate that they express a large and significant body of popular sentiment.
But Mousavi is not a devil, nor is he an angel and the same applies to Ahmadinejad. The two are political rivals who competed in the electoral process, campaigning on the basis of their respective beliefs regarding what best serves Iran's national interests. Herein resides a major lesson in real life.
Sufism not only plays a major role in Iranian culture -- its influence extends to its political heritage. Indeed, we could say that present-day Iran is very much an extension of the great legacy of such Sufi philosophers and poets as Khayyam, Hafez, Bastami and Rumi. The political and cultural substance in Iran has naturally been imbued by the contributions of these intellectual and literary giants, some of whom explored causal relations that extend beyond the immediately discernible.
In his major poem Mathnawi wa Ma'nawi (Spiritual Couplets), Rumi relates the story of two ants walking by a splendid painting of colourful flowers. The first ant tells the second, "My, what a beautiful painting this is! It all has to do with the colours." The second responds, "No, the beauty stems from the fingers that controlled how the colours were applied." To which the first answers, "But the fingers are nothing without the influence of the wrist. The wrist is the most important!" Naturally, the wrist leads to the forearm, the forearm to the upper arm, and finally the arm to the mind, which, as the second ant says, "moves the upper arm, the forearm, the wrist, and the fingers." The first ant pauses at this and then says, "But the mind, unless transformed by God, is mere matter."
The story, of course, is a parable about epistemology. Rumi has a perception of a "partial mind" and a "total mind", the former belonging to human beings and, hence, subject to limitations of time and place, as much as it strives towards comprehending the greater truth, which can only perceived by the "total" or all-seeing mind. If we may apply Rumi's famous spiritual-metaphysical concept to present-day Iranian politics, we might say that there exists an Iranian strategic mind above the parts, these being the candidates and the tactical approaches and partial ideas they advocate. The strategic or "whole" mind draws the greater picture and the candidates move within its contours to the extent their manoeuvrability and skills permit.
One cannot escape the observation that each of the presidents of the Iranian Republic from Rafsanjani through Khatami to Ahmadinejad had certain traits that suited Iran's national interests at the time. Rafsanjani served as president in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and oversaw the reconstruction of the country at a crucial and precarious moment. Because of his influence among all the articulations of the regime, and his "historic legitimacy" during the Islamic revolution, his presence at the helm alleviated internal contradictions and helped smooth Tehran's emergence from its international isolation.
Khatami was the intellectual and enlightened president who rehabilitated Iran's "soft power" through his appeals to a "dialogue of civilisation" and "faith and philosophy" which, incidentally, demonstrated the Iranian talent in transposing its rich Sufi metaphysical heritage into contemporary moulds.
In the era of the smiling, open-minded Khatami, Iran made impressive and irreversible leaps forward in its nuclear programme. In Ahmadinejad's first term, Khatami's foremost achievement -- the inroad into nuclear technology -- became the mainspring for Iran's regional project. Aided by former US president Bush's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, Iran under Ahmadinejad succeeded in expanding its regional influence as never before. By the end of his term, Obama was elected president in the US and had begun to make overtures to Iran that would have been inconceivable under Bush.
Iran is not facing a problem in Iraq; Obama is, having inherited it from his predecessor. Tehran is not the party that has to reassure its allies that it will be entering into dialogue with Washington; the reverse is the case. Now that the tone of US-Iranian relations has shifted from sabre-rattling to conciliation, the Iranian strategic mind seems to have rejected the Obama framework for talks and that same mind seems to think that another Ahmadinejad term will best serve to secure concessions or further softening from Washington.
Apparently, too, that mind feels that the current regional situation presents an opportunity for the further expansion of Iranian influence before finally sitting down for talks with Washington and that Ahmadinejad's hardline approach is best suited for the purpose of gaining a stronger hand.
The results of the Iranian elections can only be understood by trying to grasp the greater picture as perceived by the strategic mind behind the scene, all other innumerable details being precisely that: details.
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