Turkey's Version of Islam

By Avni Dogru MBA, "Turkey: Ruling a nation through fear" - Today's Zaman - New York/Istanbul, Turkey
Saturday, April 5, 2008

The recent bid by Turkey's chief prosecutor to have the Constitutional Court shut down the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is the latest manifestation of Turkey's extremist secular elite's fear of losing control over the republic.

It was a shock for many and the majority of Turks viewed it as a step backward in Turkey's democratization process and an embarrassment to the country's image. However, it actually is more of a milestone along the way to a mature, exemplary democracy.

A relatively young democracy, Turkey has come a long way through tumultuous times since its birth in 1923.

Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was an unusually insightful leader, reforming his nation by changing its entire trajectory of development toward a goal of modernization and increased civil rights in an era when tyrannical waves were sweeping the world; namely, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany and later Franco in Spain. Yet, after his death Turkey faced three major military coups and even endured the execution of one prime minister and two ministers by a military junta following a coup in 1960.

While the Turkish military was once the main tool used to interrupt the democratic progress in Turkey, the judicial system has also been targeted for manipulation by Turkey's extremist secular elite. Without a fully independent legal system, Turkish courts have been used to suppress unwanted ideologies -- 26 political parties have been shut down by the same judges since 1954.

Today, Turkish democracy is at a very different point than even a decade ago and a military coup is no longer likely. The governing party, the AK Party, has done much to put the military under civilian control with the undeniable support of the EU. However, the judicial system continues to be manipulated by Turkey's elite, who pose as secularists, but represent the protectionist and autocratic ideologies of the 1930s.

They have become very uncomfortable with the AK Party's attempts to remove the headscarf ban at universities, as well as the party's support of the first civil constitution project. Since the current constitution was prepared by five generals after a coup in 1980, a civil constitution is a necessary step forward for Turkish democracy.

It is of note that Turkey adapted its secularism from the French "laïcité" in 1937. Unlike Anglo-Saxon secularism at play throughout America and most of Europe, which promotes freedom of thought and religion, laïcité is associated with obstructed religious freedom.

In February 2004, the French parliament banned religious symbols such as the Islamic headscarf, the Christian cross and the Jewish skullcap in public secondary schools. This law created a major social rift in France and was considered an audacious leadership move by many in secular countries around the world.

In Turkey's case, although it is not banned by the Constitution, the Constitutional Court relied on only a lower court's ruling after a coup in 1997 to enforce a ban on women wearing headscarves in universities.

To be sure, Turkey implemented a ban far more radical than the French. In France, it is still possible to wear headscarves at universities and private secondary schools, yet these basic rights were taken away from Turkish women without any checks and balances.

What many people don't know is that Turkey's version of Islam is not a threat to secularism in Turkey, as it is strongly tempered by the social integration of Muhammed Jelaluddin Rumi's philosophy of tolerance and Sufism.

This non-exclusionary leaning on the part of Turks makes for a healthier practice of the religion throughout the country compared with the rest of the world.

No matter what is shown as the reason to shut down the AK Party, the deeper political motives are quite different and hidden. Turkish society has been going through major social changes in the last decade, causing tension between Turkey's marginal elite, who see themselves above everyone and prefer the status quo and autocracy, and the rest of the Turkish citizens, who want more freedom and rights. Globalization and an open society threaten the 1930s protectionist policies.

As a result of the new economic boom, the fortified conservative middle class wants to have a say in the country's future. Meanwhile, Turkey's marginal elite is trying in every way possible not to share power. The root source of the fighting is this shifting power from the marginal elite to the people on the street.

In the past, the motto of "saving secularism" as an excuse to hoard power has always worked. But, if there was a real threat to secularism in Turkey, the results of a comparative study done by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), a leading Turkish think tank, in 1999 and late 2006 would show it.

The study shows that from 1999 to 2006, the percentage of Turkish citizens who would favor a Shariah-based religious regime dropped from 21 percent to 9 percent. In the same period, the percentage of women wearing a headscarf decreased by 9 percent even though this choice of dress became more visible in larger cities due to migration.

All democracies go through a maturation stage and face similar challenges.

Even though the chief prosecutor's bid against the AK Party challenges Turkish democracy in the short run, Turkey is not the same country that it was 10 years ago. The majority of Turks are now aware that their democratic gains are at stake with this bid. Accordingly, there is growing public sympathy for the AK Party.

Recent polls show the AK Party's approval rating has jumped from 47 percent in the July 2007 elections to between 60 and 70 percent after the recent court case. Turkey's elite is mired in so much fear that it does not even realize how much it is helping the AK Party gain power.

[Map from: US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm#political].